




INDIA - CHILE BILATERAL COOPERATION FRAMEWORK

YOUTH PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT FORUM

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TABLE OF CONTENT

Foreword

Message from the Chairman, Youth Peace and Development Forum.....	Pg No. 5
Message from the Vice Chairman, Youth Peace and Development Forum.....	Pg No. 7
Message from the In-charge, International Cooperation Framework.....	Pg No. 9

Executive Summary.....	Pg No. 13
-------------------------------	------------------

Acknowledgement.....	Pg No. 16
-----------------------------	------------------

Vision for the Two Nations.....	Pg No. 17
--	------------------

Guiding Principles of Bilateral Cooperation.....	Pg No. 21
---	------------------

31 Pillars of Cooperation

1. Political Cooperation.....	Pg No. 25
2. Diplomatic Cooperation.....	Pg No. 28
3. Economic and Trade Cooperation.....	Pg No. 30
4. Financial Cooperation.....	Pg No. 32
5. Investment Cooperation.....	Pg No. 34
6. Energy Cooperation.....	Pg No. 36
7. Defence and Security Cooperation.....	Pg No. 38
8. Maritime and Blue Economy Cooperation	Pg No. 40
9. Water Resources Cooperation.....	Pg No. 42
10. Agriculture and Food Security Cooperation.....	Pg No. 44
11. Science, Technology and Innovation Cooperation.....	Pg No. 46
12. Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Technologies Cooperation.....	Pg No. 48
13. Digital and Cyber Security Cooperation.....	Pg No. 50
14. Space Cooperation.....	Pg No. 52
15. Environmental and Climate Cooperation.....	Pg No. 54
16. Disaster Management and Humanitarian Cooperation.....	Pg No. 56
17. Infrastructure and Connectivity Cooperation.....	Pg No. 58
18. Industrial and Manufacturing Cooperation.....	Pg No. 60
19. Academic and Educational Cooperation.....	Pg No. 62
20. Healthcare and Public Health Cooperation.....	Pg No. 64
21. Youth Cooperation.....	Pg No. 66
22. Women Empowerment and Gender Equality Cooperation.....	Pg No. 67
23. Labour, Employment and Migration Cooperation.....	Pg No. 69
24. Tourism Cooperation.....	Pg No. 71
25. Sports Cooperation.....	Pg No. 73
26. Culture and Heritage Cooperation.....	Pg No. 75
27. Parliamentary and Governance Cooperation.....	Pg No. 77
28. Legal and Judicial Cooperation.....	Pg No. 79
29. Multilateral and Regional Cooperation.....	Pg No. 82

30. Sustainable Development Cooperation.....	Pg No. 84
31. Innovation and Entrepreneurship Cooperation.....	Pg No. 86

Implementation Framework

Institutional Mechanisms.....	Pg No. 88
Joint Working Groups.....	Pg No. 90
Monitoring and Evaluation Framework.....	Pg No. 91
Periodic Review Mechanism.....	Pg No. 93

Roadmap for Future Cooperation

Strategic Vision 2050	Pg No.95
Short-Term Priorities (1–5 Years).....	Pg No.96
Medium-Term Priorities (5–15 Years).....	PgNo. 98
Long-Term Strategic Goals (15–30 Years).....	Pg No.99

End Note	PgNo.101
References	Pg No.104

MESSAGE FROM THE CHAIRMAN

It gives me immense pleasure to extend my warm greetings to all distinguished dignitaries, policymakers, diplomats, scholars, youth leaders, and friends associated with the Youth Peace and Development Forum. This publication commemorates and reflects upon the growing relationship between the **Republic of India and the Republic of Chile**, a partnership that has evolved into an important avenue for cooperation between Asia and Latin America.

India and Chile share a relationship founded upon mutual respect, democratic values, economic complementarities, cultural understanding, and a common commitment to peace, sustainable development, and international cooperation. Over the years, our bilateral engagement has expanded across trade and investment, science and technology, education, innovation, agriculture, mining, renewable energy, culture, people-to-people relations, and emerging areas of cooperation. This broadening partnership demonstrates the considerable potential and resilience of India–Chile relations.

The **India–Chile Bilateral Cooperation Framework** provides an important avenue for deepening this partnership and creating new opportunities for meaningful engagement. In an increasingly interconnected world, bilateral cooperation cannot remain confined to governments alone. It must also involve civil society, academic institutions, young professionals, entrepreneurs, researchers, cultural organisations, and, most importantly, the youth of both countries.

The Youth Peace and Development Forum strongly believes that **young people are not merely the leaders of tomorrow; they are important partners in building peace and development today**. The demographic strength, creativity, technological ability, and entrepreneurial spirit of the younger generations in India and Chile provide enormous opportunities for cooperation. Greater youth-to-youth interaction can contribute to mutual understanding, reduce geographical and cultural barriers, and create lasting foundations for friendship between our societies.

India and Chile have much to learn from each other. India's experience in democratic governance, digital public infrastructure, entrepreneurship, education, space technology, sustainable development, and its diverse cultural traditions can contribute to greater bilateral understanding. Similarly, Chile's experience in economic development, mining and natural-resource management, renewable energy, scientific research, innovation, environmental governance, and its growing engagement with the Asia-Pacific region offer valuable opportunities for exchange and collaboration.

In this context, strategic cooperation should not be understood only in terms of economic or diplomatic interests. A truly strategic partnership must also possess a strong **human dimension**. Cooperation in education, youth development, culture, research, climate action, sustainable development, science and technology, and social innovation can strengthen the

foundations upon which diplomatic relations are built. The Youth Peace and Development Forum seeks to contribute to this process by encouraging dialogue, knowledge-sharing, youth participation, and constructive engagement between India and Chile. We believe that platforms bringing together young people from both countries can generate new ideas and practical initiatives in areas such as peacebuilding, sustainable development, technology, entrepreneurship, education, cultural exchange, environmental cooperation, and community development.

The world today faces complex challenges, including geopolitical tensions, economic uncertainties, climate change, technological disruption, misinformation, environmental degradation, and threats to social cohesion. No country can effectively address these challenges in isolation. Strong bilateral and multilateral partnerships are therefore essential. India and Chile, as two vibrant democracies with significant economic potential and a shared commitment to multilateralism, can make a meaningful contribution to a peaceful, prosperous, sustainable, and rules-based international order. Our cooperation must therefore look towards the future. We should encourage greater interaction among universities and research institutions, expand opportunities for student and professional exchanges, facilitate innovation partnerships, promote cultural diplomacy, strengthen cooperation in sustainable development and climate action, and create platforms where young people can participate in discussions concerning international affairs and global development.

The India–Chile relationship has considerable untapped potential. The responsibility before us is to transform this potential into sustained, substantive, and inclusive cooperation. Diplomatic relations become truly meaningful when they positively influence the lives of ordinary people and create opportunities for future generations. As Chairman of the Youth Peace and Development Forum, I reaffirm our commitment to strengthening friendship and cooperation between India and the Republic of Chile. We look forward to supporting initiatives that bring our peoples closer, promote mutual understanding, and encourage young citizens to become ambassadors of peace, cooperation, and development.

May the **India–Chile partnership** continue to grow from strength to strength and emerge as a model of constructive bilateral engagement connecting India with Latin America and contributing to a more peaceful, prosperous, and sustainable world.

With best wishes for a stronger, deeper, and future-oriented **India–Chile partnership**.

Dheeraj G N
Chairman
Youth Peace and Development Forum

MESSAGE FROM THE VICE CHAIRMAN

It is a privilege to contribute this message to a publication dedicated to the **India–Chile Bilateral Cooperation Framework**. The evolving partnership between India and the Republic of Chile represents a relationship of considerable potential and importance, built upon shared democratic values, mutual respect, economic cooperation, sustainable development, and a growing understanding between our peoples. The relationship between India and Chile has developed significantly over the decades. What began as diplomatic engagement has progressively expanded into a broader partnership covering diverse areas of mutual interest. Today, both countries recognise the importance of working together to address emerging regional and global challenges while creating new opportunities for economic and social progress.

The strategic significance of India–Chile relations is particularly evident in an increasingly interconnected international environment. India and Chile occupy important positions in their respective regions and can serve as bridges between Asia and Latin America. Greater cooperation between the two countries can contribute significantly to economic connectivity, sustainable development, innovation, and a more balanced and inclusive international order. However, strategic diplomacy must extend beyond government-to-government relations. The strength of any bilateral partnership ultimately depends upon the connections established between its people. This is why **people-to-people diplomacy and youth engagement** deserve particular attention.

The youth of India and Chile represent a powerful bridge between our societies. Young people are increasingly connected through technology, education, entrepreneurship, cultural interests, research, and shared global concerns. Creating more opportunities for interaction can transform these connections into meaningful partnerships and lasting friendships. The Youth Peace and Development Forum believes that youth cooperation can become one of the most dynamic dimensions of India–Chile relations. Academic exchanges, youth conferences, cultural programmes, leadership initiatives, research collaborations, innovation networks, and social-development projects can encourage young Indians and Chileans to understand one another beyond geographical and cultural boundaries.

Such engagement is particularly important for promoting peace. Peace is not simply the absence of conflict; it is also the presence of dialogue, mutual respect, social justice, cooperation, and shared opportunities. Young people who understand different cultures and perspectives are better equipped to challenge stereotypes, resist intolerance, and contribute to peaceful and inclusive societies.

Economic and technological cooperation also offers enormous possibilities. India and Chile possess complementary strengths in areas such as mining, renewable energy, agriculture, digital technologies, innovation, research, education, entrepreneurship, and sustainable development. Encouraging collaboration among young entrepreneurs, researchers,

technology professionals, and educational institutions can create new avenues for inclusive and sustainable growth.

At the same time, cultural diplomacy should remain an essential component of the bilateral relationship. India's rich civilisational heritage and Chile's distinctive cultural traditions provide a strong foundation for mutual appreciation. Cultural exchanges, academic programmes, artistic collaborations, and youth initiatives can deepen the understanding that forms the human foundation of diplomatic relations. We must also recognise that development and peace are closely connected. Sustainable development requires cooperation across borders, particularly in addressing climate change, environmental challenges, inequality, energy security, food security, and technological transformation. India and Chile can share experiences, expertise, and innovative solutions while working towards a more sustainable future.

The **India–Chile Bilateral Cooperation Framework** should therefore be viewed not merely as an instrument of diplomatic engagement but as an opportunity to develop a **long-term vision for partnership**. Such a vision should involve governments, institutions, businesses, universities, civil society organisations, researchers, and citizens. The Youth Peace and Development Forum remains committed to encouraging dialogue and cooperation in this direction. We seek to create platforms where young people can exchange ideas, understand contemporary international issues, develop leadership skills, and participate constructively in peace and development initiatives.

The future of India–Chile relations will ultimately be shaped not only by agreements signed today but also by the relationships and institutions that we build for tomorrow. By investing in young people, strengthening educational and cultural exchanges, and promoting cooperation based on mutual respect, our two countries can build a partnership capable of responding to the challenges of the twenty-first century. As Vice Chairman of the Youth Peace and Development Forum, I extend my sincere appreciation to all those working towards stronger India–Chile relations. I hope this publication contributes to greater awareness, dialogue, and cooperation and encourages readers to recognise the immense possibilities that exist between our two nations.

May the **India–Chile partnership** continue to flourish and inspire future generations through friendship, innovation, mutual respect, sustainable development, and a shared commitment to peace and prosperity.

Aravind Saj
Vice Chairman
Youth Peace and Development Forum

MESSAGE FROM THE IN-CHARGE

It gives me immense pleasure to present this publication dedicated to the **India–Republic of Chile Bilateral Cooperation Framework**. This framework represents an effort by the Youth Peace and Development Forum to examine the evolving relationship between two democratic nations that, despite being separated by considerable geographical distance, share important values and interests in promoting peace, sustainable development, economic cooperation, multilateralism, and mutual understanding.

India and Chile have developed a warm and constructive relationship over the years, with bilateral engagement gradually expanding across political, economic, cultural, scientific, technological, educational, and multilateral spheres. The relationship today stands at an important stage of development, with considerable potential for moving beyond traditional areas of engagement towards a more comprehensive and forward-looking partnership.

The recent momentum in India–Chile relations provides an encouraging foundation for this next phase. The State Visit of the President of Chile to India in 2025 gave renewed political impetus to bilateral relations and provided an opportunity to identify new areas of cooperation. The decision to initiate negotiations for a **Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement** is particularly significant, as it reflects the shared ambition of both countries to strengthen economic engagement, expand market opportunities, encourage investment, and create a more predictable environment for businesses.

Economic cooperation, however, represents only one dimension of the relationship. India and Chile possess complementary strengths that can support a much broader partnership. Chile's position as an important producer of critical minerals, its considerable renewable-energy potential, its agricultural capabilities, and its strategic position in Latin America offer significant opportunities for cooperation with India. At the same time, India's large market, growing manufacturing capabilities, pharmaceutical sector, information technology, digital services, space programme, agricultural expertise, and expanding innovation ecosystem provide important opportunities for Chile.

Particular attention should therefore be given to **critical minerals and sustainable energy cooperation**. The global transition towards electric mobility, renewable energy, advanced electronics, and other emerging technologies has increased the importance of secure and diversified supply chains. Chile's mineral resources and India's growing technological and industrial requirements create a strong basis for cooperation in this area. Future engagement should not be limited to the extraction and import of resources, but should also explore processing, value addition, technology development, research, investment, and environmentally sustainable mining practices.

The same principle applies to cooperation in **science, technology, innovation, and entrepreneurship**. The rapidly changing technological environment presents both challenges and opportunities for India and Chile. Greater interaction between universities, research institutions, technology companies, start-ups, and innovation centres can create new avenues

for collaboration in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, space technology, digital services, climate science, agriculture, and other emerging fields. Joint research programmes and innovation exchanges can help both countries benefit from each other's expertise and experience.

People-to-people relations are ultimately the foundation upon which lasting international partnerships are built. Governments can sign agreements and institutions can establish mechanisms, but it is the interaction between ordinary citizens, students, researchers, entrepreneurs, artists, professionals, and communities that gives a bilateral relationship its enduring character. Greater opportunities for Indians and Chileans to meet, learn, work, and create together can therefore contribute significantly to the long-term strength of the partnership.

As the In-Charge of the Youth Peace and Development Forum, I extend my sincere appreciation to all diplomats, policymakers, researchers, academics, experts, youth leaders, institutions, and stakeholders whose efforts contribute to strengthening the understanding between India and the Republic of Chile. Their continued engagement demonstrates the importance of creating platforms through which international relationships can be studied, discussed, and strengthened by the younger generation.

I hope this publication will serve as a useful contribution to the continuing dialogue on India–Chile relations and encourage policymakers, researchers, students, and young leaders to explore new possibilities for cooperation. More importantly, I hope it inspires a broader understanding that diplomacy is not limited to official meetings and agreements; it is also about building trust, creating friendships, exchanging knowledge, and developing a shared vision for the future.

The coming years present an important opportunity for India and Chile. If the momentum already visible in economic and diplomatic relations is matched by deeper cooperation in technology, education, culture, youth engagement, critical minerals, renewable energy, agriculture, innovation, and sustainable development, the relationship can develop into a genuinely comprehensive partnership.

May the friendship between **India and the Republic of Chile** continue to grow through mutual respect, shared prosperity, innovation, cultural understanding, and a common commitment to peace and sustainable development. May the partnership create new opportunities for present and future generations and contribute meaningfully to a more cooperative, inclusive, and peaceful international community.

Akhish S
In-Charge
Youth Peace and Development Forum

Executive Summary

The India-Chile Cooperative Framework sets out a structured, long-term architecture for deepening the strategic partnership between the Republic of India and the Republic of Chile. The relationship rests on a foundation considerably older than its current period of acceleration, built through a Framework Agreement on Economic Cooperation signed in January 2005 and a Preferential Trade Agreement signed in March 2006, which made Chile the first Latin American country to conclude a formal trade pact with India (Economic Diplomacy, 2026). That agreement was substantially expanded in 2017, widening tariff concessions from roughly 474 product lines to more than 2,800 (Economic Diplomacy, 2026).

This framework is organized around 31 pillars of cooperation, spanning political, diplomatic, economic, financial, investment, energy, defence and security, maritime, water resources, agricultural, scientific, technological, digital, spatial, environmental, humanitarian, infrastructural, industrial, educational, healthcare, youth, gender, labour, tourism, sporting, cultural, parliamentary, legal, multilateral, sustainable development, and entrepreneurial domains. Each pillar is treated as a discrete but interconnected stream of cooperation, with its own current status and forward-looking priority actions, supported by an implementation framework of institutional mechanisms and a roadmap extending to 2050.

The relationship's current phase of acceleration centres on the negotiation of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, building on the existing Preferential Trade Agreement. The decision to launch these negotiations was taken at a meeting between Chile's then President Gabriel Boric and Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi in April 2025, followed by the signing of Terms of Reference on 8 May 2025 and a first negotiating round later that month (newsonair) (newsonair) (News on Air, 2025a, 2025b). By January 2026, four rounds of talks had been completed, with Chile's ambassador to India describing the two sides as close to concluding the agreement (News on Air, 2026a).

Momentum continued into 2026, marked by a visit from Chile's Minister of Foreign Affairs to New Delhi in May 2026 for talks with India's Minister of Commerce and Industry. Bilateral trade figures vary depending on the source and measurement period. The Embassy of India in Santiago reports that trade grew from approximately 3.84 billion United States dollars in 2024 to 5.38 billion dollars in 2025, ranking Chile as India's fifth-largest trading partner within Latin America and the Caribbean (Indianembassysantiago) (Embassy of India, Santiago, 2026). A separate analysis places trade at roughly 3.75 billion dollars and ranks Chile as India's third-largest trading partner in the region, after Brazil and Mexico (newsonair) (Economic Diplomacy, 2026). This framework presents both figures with their distinct attribution rather than reconciling them, consistent with the divergent reporting this kind of bilateral relationship commonly produces.

Critical minerals form the strategic core of the relationship's current trajectory, distinguishing the India-Chile Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement from more conventional tariff-focused trade pacts. Chile holds an estimated 30 percent of the world's lithium reserves and remains the world's largest copper producer (Lapaas Voice) (Whalesbook, 2026), positioning it centrally within a Latin American region that collectively holds roughly 60 percent of global lithium reserves and nearly 40 percent of global copper reserves (Whalesbook) (Rio Times, 2026). India's demand for both minerals, driven by its electric vehicle, renewable energy, and electronics manufacturing ambitions, is currently met entirely through imports. In February 2026, Coal India Limited's board approved the creation of a wholly owned holding company in Chile to explore critical mineral opportunities, backed by an approved investment of 6,300 crore rupees (The Rio Times) (Organiser, 2026), and by August 2026 the company was reported to be weighing acquisition of a Chile based lithium unit belonging to a Canadian mining firm (The Rio Times) (Organiser, 2026). This mineral focused engagement operates alongside India's National Critical Mineral Mission, approved in 2025 with an outlay of 32,000 crore rupees (Organiser Weekly) (MP-IDSA, 2026).

Institutional architecture beneath these headline developments includes a Joint Commission Meeting, co-chaired by the two countries' foreign ministers, which held its second session in New Delhi in August 2024, and a Foreign Office Consultations mechanism, which held its ninth round in Santiago in November 2025 (Indianembassysantiago) (Embassy of India, Santiago, 2026), a round number suggesting a mechanism considerably more established than the newer, mineral specific engagement described above. Antarctic cooperation occupies a distinctive place in this relationship relative to India's other major bilateral partnerships, reflecting Chile's geographic position as a gateway to the continent and both countries' status as parties to the Antarctic Treaty System, which this framework's later pillars examine as a genuine area of scientific convergence rather than a peripheral talking point.

Similarly, the two countries' shared history of state owned enterprise engagement in the critical minerals sector, most concretely expressed through the comparison this framework draws between India's more advanced, block specific lithium exploration agreement in neighbouring Argentina and its still developing, largely memorandum based engagement in Chile, offers a candid illustration of the distance that remains between diplomatic intent and commercial execution in even the relationship's most strategically prioritized pillar.

This framework proceeds from the premise that the India-Chile relationship, built on two decades of trade liberalization and now entering a period of critical minerals-driven strategic convergence, is positioned to move from a modest, geographically distant trade relationship toward a more substantial partnership encompassing mining investment, renewable energy, scientific cooperation, and Antarctic research. The chapters that follow examine each of the 31 pillars in turn, before setting out the institutional mechanisms, monitoring arrangements, and phased roadmap through 2050 required to convert this momentum into a durable partnership.

Acknowledgement

The Youth Peace and Development (YPD) Forum expresses its deepest gratitude to all individuals, institutions, and domain experts whose dedication, geopolitical insight, and intellectual contributions made the preparation of *The India–Chile Bilateral Cooperation Framework* possible.

We extend our profound gratitude to the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of Chile. The enduring diplomatic, economic, and strategic initiatives undertaken by both governments provided the foundational context and historical bedrock for this comprehensive framework.

The Forum places on record its sincere appreciation to **Dheeraj GN, Chairman of the Youth Peace and Development Forum**, for his visionary leadership and initiative in conceptualizing this vital geopolitical project. Heartfelt thanks are also extended to **Aravind Saj, Vice Chairman of the Youth Peace and Development Forum**, for his continuous encouragement and strategic guidance throughout the execution of this comprehensive initiative.

The Forum also wishes to express its special thanks to the **Embassy of the Republic of Korea in New Delhi** for its continuous efforts in fostering public diplomacy, cultural ties, and educational exchanges. Its work has significantly enriched the bilateral discourse and inspired the younger generation to engage deeply with India–Chile relations.

Special appreciation is due to **Aman Chauhan** and the core research coordination team for their valuable support in streamlining the research process. The Forum further acknowledges the vital contributions of **Monish Krishna, Secretary General of the Youth Peace and Development Forum**, whose administrative leadership and organizational commitment have been instrumental in successfully navigating the complexities of bilateral policy research.

The Forum further extends its appreciation to all well-wishers, advisors, and stakeholders who encouraged this initiative. Whether through expert consultations, peer reviews, or moral support, their contributions helped strengthen the relevance and strategic accuracy of this work.

This report is a reflection of a shared commitment to building a stable, multipolar world anchored in mutual trust and cooperation. While the recommendations contained herein aim to explore new and dynamic avenues for India–Chile cooperation in the twenty-first century, they also serve as a proud testament to the time-tested and enduring friendship between the two great nations.

Vision for the Two Nations

The India-Chile relationship occupies an unusual position among India's major bilateral partnerships, formally old and substantively modest, connected by seventy-six years of uninterrupted diplomatic relations and by a preferential trade agreement that made Chile the first Latin American country to conclude a formal trade pact with India, yet transacting at a fraction of the volume India's more geographically proximate partnerships achieve. This framework's central vision is that the relationship's April 2025 inflection point, marked by President Boric's State Visit and the launch of Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations, can convert that formal depth into substantive scale, organized around a single strategic logic this framework terms minerals for markets.

India's vision for this partnership begins with a need that has become increasingly urgent across its energy transition, electric vehicle, and electronics manufacturing programmes: secure, diversified access to lithium and copper, minerals India currently imports in their entirety. Chile holds an estimated 30 percent of the world's lithium reserves and remains the world's largest copper producer, positioning it among a small number of countries capable of meaningfully addressing India's mineral security concerns at scale. India's vision, consistent with the pattern this framework has observed in comparable relationships, treats Chile not merely as a source of raw material but as a partner in a National Critical Mineral Mission that this framework's later pillars describe in detail, one that explicitly seeks processing and value chain participation rather than simple offtake agreements. This ambition sits alongside India's own positioning within the Global South, a framing Prime Minister Modi invoked directly during the April 2025 visit by thanking President Boric for his contributions to the Voice of Global South Summit and noting convergence between the two countries on equitable access to clean and green technologies, a convergence this framework reads as giving the mineral relationship a broader diplomatic frame beyond commercial transaction alone.

Chile's vision for the partnership is shaped by a related but distinct set of imperatives. President Boric used his own State Visit to articulate an explicit ambition to move beyond raw material exports, seeking Indian industrial partnership to add value domestically rather than repeating a commodity export pattern Chile has followed with other major economies for generations. This ambition carries particular urgency given Chile's current trade concentration, with China alone accounting for approximately 39 percent of Chilean exports as of the period surrounding the April 2025 visit, a dependency this framework reads as a structural vulnerability that Chile's own government has explicitly sought to address through diversification toward partners including India. Chile's vision extends beyond minerals specifically. President Boric identified agribusiness, innovation, and creative industries as shared areas of opportunity, and Chilean officials have been explicit in seeking Indian investment into Chile itself, across ports, airports, mining, railways, infrastructure, and renewable energy, a reciprocal ambition this framework treats as at least as important to the relationship's future as India's own mineral security objectives. This reciprocal investment ambition deserves particular emphasis because public discussion of the relationship, in this

framework's own research experience, gravitates heavily toward the direction of Indian capital and demand flowing toward Chilean minerals, while comparatively little attention is paid to Chile's own, explicitly stated interest in attracting Indian capital into its domestic infrastructure and renewable energy sectors, an asymmetry of attention this framework's Investment Cooperation pillar addresses directly.

This framework proposes minerals for markets as the organizing logic that best captures the reciprocal character both governments have articulated: India securing diversified, long-term access to critical minerals essential to its energy transition, and Chile securing value-added industrial partnership and expanded market access that reduces its concentration in raw commodity exports to a narrow set of trading partners. This logic differs meaningfully from the thematic pairings this framework's companion document identified in India's relationship with the Republic of Korea, since it describes a single, bidirectional exchange rather than several parallel sectoral tracks, a difference this framework attributes to the earlier stage of institutional development the India-Chile relationship currently occupies relative to India's more industrially advanced Asian partnerships.

On the minerals side, this logic is already moving from statement to commercial activity. Coal India Limited's board approved the creation of a wholly owned holding company in Chile in February 2026, backed by an investment of 6,300 crore rupees, and by August 2026 the company was reported to be evaluating acquisition of a Chile based lithium unit belonging to a Canadian mining firm. A separate collaboration between Chile's state owned Codelco, the world's largest copper mining company, and India's Hindustan Copper Limited, agreed during the April 2025 visit, extends this mineral cooperation to copper exploration and processing expertise specifically. This framework treats the coexistence of these two distinct state-owned enterprise partnerships, one focused on lithium and led by Coal India, the other focused on copper and built around Hindustan Copper and Codelco, as evidence of a genuinely diversified mineral strategy rather than a single, narrow initiative. Both partnerships also share a structural feature worth naming, each pairs an Indian public sector enterprise with either a Chilean state owned counterpart or a Chilean regulatory process, reflecting the continued centrality of state owned enterprise to Chile's own mining sector even amid the broader market oriented economic reorientation associated with the Kast government, a continuity this framework's Investment Cooperation pillar treats as a relevant consideration for Indian firms planning their own engagement structures.

On the market side, the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations launched during the April 2025 visit are explicitly structured to extend beyond the tariff schedule expansion the two countries already achieved in 2017, addressing non-tariff barriers, sustainable supply chains, environmental protections, and labour standards through quarterly technical team meetings. Chile's decision, announced during the same visit, to grant a Multiple Entry Permit easing travel for Indian businesspersons, offers an early, concrete example of the kind of market access facilitation this framework expects the broader CEPA process to formalize at greater scale.

This framework's review of India's mineral engagement across Latin America surfaced a specific, instructive comparison. Khanij Bidesh India Limited, the joint venture of India's National Aluminium Company, Hindustan Copper, and Mineral Exploration and Consultancy Limited, established to secure critical minerals abroad, has already concluded a lithium exploration and exploitation agreement covering specific blocks in neighbouring Argentina, a considerably more advanced stage of engagement than the still largely memorandum-based cooperation this framework has documented in Chile. This framework treats that gap honestly rather than obscuring it, and reads it as evidence that diplomatic warmth, of which the India-Chile relationship has an unusually long supply, does not automatically translate into the specific, negotiated commercial instruments that the Argentina precedent demonstrates are achievable within the same broader Latin American lithium landscape.

Antarctica as a Distinctive Strand

This framework treats Antarctic cooperation as a genuinely distinctive element of the India-Chile relationship, without close parallels among India's other major bilateral partnerships. A Letter of Intent signed during the April 2025 visit connects India's National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research with Chile's Antarctic Institute, building on a striking geographic complementarity in which India operates research stations in eastern Antarctica while Chile's research presence concentrates in the western Antarctic Peninsula, allowing the two countries' scientific activity to cover largely non-overlapping ground rather than duplicating effort. This framework reads Chile's role as an enabler of India's own Antarctic and Southern Ocean ambitions as a strategic dimension of the relationship as considerably underweighted relative to its long-term significance, particularly given Chile's established leadership role within Antarctic Treaty System governance.

Structural Tensions and the Political Transition

This vision is not without structural tension, and this framework treats that tension honestly rather than assuming it away. Geographic distance remains a basic constraint on a relationship in which even accelerated cooperation must contend with logistics, shipping times, and travel connections considerably less favourable than those available to India's Asian partners, a constraint this framework's Infrastructure and Connectivity Cooperation pillar addresses directly. The relationship must also navigate the political transition from President Boric, the leader who personally launched the CEPA negotiations and championed several of the mineral partnerships described above, to President Jose Antonio Kast Rist, inaugurated in March 2026, whose government's orientation has been characterized as more market oriented than its predecessor's, a shift that could plausibly accelerate the commercial dimension of this relationship or, depending on its specific priorities, deprioritize it relative to other trade relationships Chile maintains. India's decision to send its Minister of State for External Affairs to the inauguration, meeting both incoming and outgoing leadership, signals an intent to preserve continuity through this transition, a signal this framework's Political Cooperation pillar examines in greater depth.

Guiding Principles of Bilateral Cooperation

This framework is organized around eight guiding principles that apply across all 31 pillars of cooperation. These principles function as a common reference point when specific pillars encounter tension, ambiguity, or the need for prioritization, and they are intended to be read together rather than in isolation, since several pillars draw simultaneously on more than one principle.

Reciprocal Value Creation. Every pillar of cooperation is expected to generate identifiable value for both economies, not simply for one side. This principle formalizes the minerals for markets logic described in the Vision for the Two Nations, requiring that India's pursuit of secure lithium and copper access be matched, pillar by pillar, with genuine attention to Chile's own stated ambition to move beyond raw material export through value added industrial partnership and expanded access to Indian markets and capital. This framework treats pillar level proposals that serve only Indian mineral demand, without a corresponding benefit to Chilean industrial development or market access, as incomplete under this principle regardless of their commercial attractiveness to Indian firms in isolation. Concretely, this principle requires that mineral pillars specifically evaluate whether Indian investment is structured around raw extraction alone or includes a genuine processing, technology transfer, or joint venture component of the kind Chile has explicitly requested.

Distance as a Design Constraint, Not an Excuse. India and Chile sit at close to opposite ends of the globe from one another, a geographic reality this framework treats as a structural condition every pillar must design around rather than a background fact to be periodically lamented. Where India's relationships with several Asian partners can rely on relatively short flight times and established shipping lanes, cooperation between India and Chile must be built with deliberate attention to logistics costs, time zone separation, and the comparative absence of dense connectivity infrastructure, a consideration this principle requires every pillar's priority actions to address explicitly rather than assume away. This principle also implies that success metrics appropriate to India's Asian partnerships, high frequency air connectivity or dense sister city networks among them, should not be applied uncritically to this relationship, and that pillars should instead be judged by whether they achieve the best outcome realistically available given the distance involved.

Institutional Continuity Through Political Transition. The relationship's current momentum was substantially generated by President Boric's personal engagement during his April 2025 State Visit, and this framework treats the transition to President Kast's government, inaugurated in March 2026, as a test of whether that momentum rests on durable institutional foundations or on a single leader's individual priorities. This principle requires that pillar level mechanisms be anchored, wherever possible, in standing bureaucratic processes, mineral agency mandates, ministry work plans, and treaty level instruments, rather than in initiatives whose continuation depends on the specific enthusiasm of whichever president currently holds office in Santiago.

Moving from Memorandum to Binding Instrument. This framework's comparison between India's mineral engagement in Chile and its more advanced, block specific lithium agreement in neighbouring Argentina establishes a specific standard this principle applies throughout the document, that diplomatic goodwill and signed memoranda of understanding, however genuine, are treated as intermediate steps rather than end states. Pillars that remain at the memorandum stage are, under this principle, explicitly flagged as requiring further negotiation toward the kind of specific, commercially binding instruments the Argentina precedent demonstrates are achievable. This principle applies with equal force outside the mineral pillars specifically, since this framework's review of the relationship's broader institutional architecture found a similar pattern in several non-mineral pillars, sectoral memoranda signed with genuine political enthusiasm during set piece visits, whose subsequent implementation this framework was frequently unable to verify from public sources.

Scientific and Polar Convergence. The Antarctic cooperation described in the Vision for the Two Nations, resting on a genuine geographic complementarity between India's eastern Antarctic presence and Chile's western Antarctic Peninsula presence, is treated throughout this framework as a distinctive asset unique to this particular bilateral relationship among India's major partnerships. This principle directs relevant pillars, including Science, Technology and Innovation Cooperation and Environmental and Climate Cooperation, to treat polar and Southern Ocean research as a standing area of comparative advantage for this relationship specifically, rather than a peripheral scientific curiosity subordinate to the mineral and trade pillars that otherwise dominate public attention.

Diversification as a Shared Interest. Chile's trade concentration, with China accounting for approximately 39 percent of its exports as of the period surrounding the April 2025 visit, gives Chile a direct interest in diversifying its trading relationships that aligns with India's own interest in securing mineral supply chains not overly concentrated in any single source country. This principle treats diversification as a value the two countries pursue jointly rather than a concern unique to either side, and requires that pillars addressing trade and investment be assessed partly by whether they meaningfully advance this shared diversification objective.

Global South Solidarity and Multilateral Convergence. Beyond the bilateral relationship, India and Chile have affirmed convergence on United Nations Security Council reform, climate change, renewable energy, and counter-terrorism, and Chile's engagement with India's Voice of Global South Summit initiative reflects a broader diplomatic alignment this framework treats as reinforcing rather than separate from the bilateral pillars, while acknowledging that the two countries will not share identical positions on every regional or global question.

Sub-National and People-Centered Engagement. President Boric's visit extended deliberately beyond New Delhi to Agra, Mumbai, and Bengaluru, engaging state level political and business leadership in Maharashtra and Karnataka directly, a pattern this principle treats as a model to be replicated rather than a one time itinerary choice. This

framework treats cultural exchange, academic cooperation, and state or regional level engagement on both sides as essential to the long term sustainability of a relationship that, given the distances involved, cannot rely on the frequent, low cost travel that sustains people to people ties in several of India's geographically closer partnerships. This principle also draws on the relationship's own history for precedent, since Chile's decision to send a special envoy to India's independence celebrations in 1947, well before formal diplomatic relations were established two years later, demonstrates that meaningful people centered gestures have anchored this relationship since before its formal institutional architecture existed at all.

Together, these eight principles are designed to function less as abstract aspirations and more as a working checklist. Where a pillar chapter in this framework proposes a new initiative, that proposal has been tested against each applicable principle, whether it generates reciprocal rather than one sided benefit, whether it accounts realistically for the distance separating the two countries, whether it is anchored in durable institutions rather than individual political relationships, and whether it advances toward binding commitment rather than remaining at the level of declared intent.

The principles also provide a basis for evaluating implementation over time. As the bilateral relationship develops, new evidence, changing economic conditions, political transitions, and emerging strategic priorities may require individual pillars to be revised or rebalanced. Their purpose is therefore not to restrict cooperation within a predetermined formula, but to ensure that adaptation remains consistent with reciprocity, institutional resilience, practical feasibility, scientific collaboration, diversification, multilateral convergence, and meaningful engagement between the peoples of India and Chile.

In this sense, the principles provide both a foundation for the Framework and a continuing standard against which its future implementation can be assessed. Ultimately, these principles are intended to ensure that the India–Chile partnership develops through sustained dialogue, balanced interests, institutional continuity, practical implementation, and shared responsibility. They provide a framework through which both countries can respond to emerging opportunities and challenges while preserving mutual respect, ensuring that diplomatic goodwill is translated into durable cooperation, measurable outcomes, and lasting benefits for future generations.

Together, these principles provide a durable foundation for India–Chile cooperation, ensuring that future initiatives remain balanced, practical, institutionally resilient, mutually beneficial, and responsive to changing strategic, economic, scientific, and societal priorities.

31 PILLARS OF COOPERATION

1. Political Cooperation

Overview

Political Cooperation, as distinct from the diplomatic and consular architecture addressed in the following pillar, concerns leader-level engagement, the institutional upgrades that have periodically redefined the relationship's status, and the domestic political conditions in each country that shape the pace at which cooperation can proceed. India and Chile established diplomatic relations in 1949, a relationship notably preceded by Chile's decision to send a special envoy to India's independence celebrations in 1947, well before either country had established a formal embassy in the other's capital.

This early diplomatic gesture established a foundation of goodwill that has continued through successive political administrations. Regular consultations, official visits, and ministerial exchanges have gradually expanded the relationship beyond traditional political engagement, creating a stronger basis for cooperation across economic, strategic, scientific, cultural, and multilateral areas.

Current Status

The single most significant political event in the relationship's recent history is President Gabriel Boric's State Visit to India from 1 to 5 April 2025, his first visit to India as President and an occasion both governments used explicitly to mark seventy six years of diplomatic relations. That visit produced the decision to launch Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations, discussed in the Economic and Trade Cooperation pillar that follows, alongside agreements on disaster management and cultural exchange and a letter of intent on Antarctic cooperation. The institutional upgrade underlying this visit predates it by several years. A memorandum of understanding establishing a high level Joint Commission was signed in May 2018, during a visit by India's then Minister of State, with the first Joint Commission Meeting held virtually in October 2020 and the second convened in person in New Delhi in August 2024, co-chaired by the two countries' foreign ministers.

Political Continuity Amid a Chilean Transition

Chile's political leadership changed significantly within a year of President Boric's visit. Jose Antonio Kast Rist won Chile's presidential election and was inaugurated in March 2026, succeeding a president whose personal engagement had substantially shaped the relationship's recent momentum, including the CEPA launch and several of the mineral partnerships this framework's Investment Cooperation pillar describes. India's political leadership has remained continuous under Prime Minister Modi since 2014, again placing India in the position, familiar from this framework's companion documents on other bilateral relationships, of providing institutional continuity across a foreign partner's change of government. India's response to this transition was immediate and visible. India's Minister of

State for External Affairs represented the Government of India at President Kast's inauguration in March 2026, meeting both the incoming president and the outgoing President Boric, a dual meeting this framework reads as a deliberate signal of continuity that treats the relationship as a state to state commitment rather than one tied to a specific individual leader. This gesture carries particular weight given how central President Boric's own personal enthusiasm appears to have been to the relationship's recent acceleration, from the CEPA launch to the Antarctic letter of intent, and this framework treats India's swift outreach to the incoming Kast government as a deliberate hedge against the risk that this momentum was more personality dependent than institutionally anchored.

Parliamentary and sub-national political engagement has continued alongside these higher profile events. A parliamentary delegation from India's Lok Sabha, led by Member of Parliament Jagdambika Pal, visited Chile from 11 to 15 January 2025, and President Boric's own itinerary during his April 2025 visit extended deliberately beyond New Delhi to engage state level political leadership in Maharashtra and Karnataka, a pattern this framework's Guiding Principles identified as a model for sub-national engagement worth replicating.

Priority Actions

First, the two governments should commit to a fixed rhythm of head of state or head of government visits, given that President Boric's April 2025 visit was, notwithstanding seventy six years of diplomatic relations, a genuinely rare occurrence rather than part of an established cycle.

Second, both governments should monitor closely whether President Kast's more market oriented economic orientation accelerates or deprioritizes the mineral and trade initiatives launched under his predecessor, using the Joint Commission mechanism to surface any change in priority early.

Third, parliamentary exchange of the kind demonstrated by the January 2025 Lok Sabha delegation should be placed on a more regular, ideally annual, footing.

Fourth, the sub-national engagement pattern demonstrated during President Boric's visit to Maharashtra and Karnataka should be formalized, with specific Indian and Chilean states or regions identified for ongoing paired engagement.

Fifth, given the considerable time that elapsed between the 2018 Joint Commission memorandum and its first virtual meeting in 2020, and between that meeting and the second in 2024, this framework recommends a fixed biennial meeting cycle going forward.

Sixth, both governments should establish a standing mechanism for strategic policy coordination between major bilateral visits, allowing senior officials to review progress across the thirty-one pillars, identify emerging obstacles, and prepare substantive agendas for

future summits. This would help ensure that high-level visits consolidate ongoing cooperation rather than becoming isolated diplomatic events.

Seventh, the two governments should strengthen regular ministerial-level engagement across the principal areas of the bilateral relationship, including external affairs, commerce, mining, energy, science and technology, agriculture, health, and education. Regular sectoral consultations would ensure that political momentum is translated into concrete implementation and would reduce the risk of bilateral cooperation becoming concentrated exclusively within the foreign ministries.

Eighth, India and Chile should establish a structured mechanism for political consultation during periods of domestic political transition, ensuring that changes in government do not disrupt ongoing bilateral initiatives. Such a mechanism should provide continuity to established programmes while allowing the incoming government to reassess priorities through institutional channels rather than allowing individual projects to lapse because of changes in political leadership.

Ninth, both countries should expand engagement between think tanks, universities, and foreign-policy research institutions, creating a sustained Track II dialogue alongside official diplomatic mechanisms. Regular policy conferences, research exchanges, and joint publications could provide policymakers with independent assessments of emerging opportunities and challenges while developing a wider community of experts with long-term familiarity with India–Chile relations.

Tenth, the Joint Commission should publish or circulate a consolidated implementation review following each meeting, identifying commitments completed, initiatives under implementation, unresolved issues, and priorities for the subsequent review cycle. Such systematic reporting would strengthen institutional accountability and provide both governments with a common reference point for measuring whether political commitments are translating into sustained and measurable bilateral outcomes.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with the Prime Minister's Office and Ministry of External Affairs on the Indian side, and the Office of the President and Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Chilean side, with the Joint Commission as the apex review mechanism. Read alongside the Diplomatic Cooperation pillar that follows.

2. Diplomatic Cooperation

Overview

Where Political Cooperation addresses leader-level engagement, Diplomatic Cooperation addresses the institutional and consular architecture that sustains the relationship day to day. This includes the functioning of embassies, foreign ministries, consular services, official consultations, diplomatic exchanges, and mechanisms for maintaining communication between governments. For India and Chile, strengthening this architecture is particularly important given the considerable geographical distance between the two countries. Effective diplomatic institutions can ensure continuity between high-level visits, support growing economic and people-to-people engagement, and provide practical channels for addressing emerging bilateral issues.

Current Diplomatic Architecture

India maintains its diplomatic presence in Chile through a single embassy in Santiago. Chile maintains a comparatively larger presence in India, its embassy in New Delhi supported by a consulate general in Mumbai and consular representation in Chennai and Kolkata, with the New Delhi embassy also carrying responsibility for Chile's interests in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. This asymmetry mirrors a pattern observed in several of India's other bilateral relationships, though the underlying scale here reflects the relationship's overall modest institutional footprint.

Foreign Office Consultations, held at the senior official level, provide the principal working level channel beneath the Joint Commission. The eighth round was held in New Delhi in March 2023, and the ninth in Santiago in November 2025, a cadence this framework's Political Cooperation pillar has already recommended tightening.

Diplomatic Breadth Beyond Headline Mechanisms

The range of agreements the two countries have signed extends into diplomatic housekeeping matters this framework treats as a useful, easily overlooked indicator of institutional maturity. Alongside memoranda on trade, science and technology, agriculture, and Antarctica, India and Chile have concluded an agreement on the gainful employment of spouses and eligible dependents of diplomatic personnel, a category of agreement that typically signals a relationship mature enough to address the practical needs of a resident diplomatic community, not only headline political and economic cooperation. This framework reads that agreement as evidence that the relationship's routine, unglamorous functioning is genuinely well established even where its higher profile economic ambitions remain earlier stage.

Priority Actions

First, India should evaluate expanding its diplomatic presence in Chile beyond Santiago, particularly if the mineral partnerships mature, given Chile's mining industry is concentrated in its northern regions.

Second, Foreign Office Consultations should move to a fixed biennial schedule, aligned with the Joint Commission rhythm recommended earlier.

Third, consular services should be reviewed for capacity to support the growing population of business travellers this framework anticipates as CEPA negotiations and mineral partnerships advance.

Fourth, the diplomatic housekeeping agreements already in place should be publicized more actively as evidence of the relationship's institutional maturity.

Fifth, given the distance separating the two countries, both foreign ministries should examine formalizing virtual formats, of the kind used for the first Joint Commission Meeting, as a standing option for intersessional contact.

Sixth, both governments should strengthen diplomatic coordination on trade, investment, and critical minerals, ensuring that embassies and relevant economic agencies have sufficient sector-specific expertise to support businesses and investors. This would allow diplomatic missions to respond more effectively to the expanding commercial priorities of the bilateral relationship.

Seventh, both countries should establish a regular exchange programme for junior diplomats and foreign-policy officials, providing participants with greater familiarity with the partner country's political, economic, and strategic environment.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with the Ministry of External Affairs of India and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, operating through their embassies, consular missions, and Foreign Office Consultations. Read alongside Political Cooperation preceding it and Economic and Trade Cooperation that follows.

3. Economic and Trade Cooperation

Overview

Economic and Trade Cooperation rests on the oldest formal instrument in the India-Chile relationship, and is the pillar in which the current period of acceleration is most concretely expressed through the ongoing CEPA negotiations.

Current Status

India and Chile signed a Framework Agreement on Economic Cooperation in January 2005, followed by a Preferential Trade Agreement in March 2006, the first formal trade pact Chile concluded with India, later expanded in 2017 from roughly 474 tariff lines to more than 2,800. Bilateral trade figures vary by source: the Embassy of India in Santiago reports trade growing from approximately 3.84 billion dollars in 2024 to 5.38 billion dollars in 2025, ranking Chile fifth among India's Latin American and Caribbean trading partners, while a separate analysis places trade at roughly 3.75 billion dollars and ranks Chile third in the region after Brazil and Mexico. This framework presents both figures with their distinct attribution rather than reconciling them.

CEPA negotiations were announced during President Boric's April 2025 visit, with Terms of Reference signed 8 May 2025 and a first round later that month. By January 2026, four rounds had been completed, with Chile's ambassador to India describing the two sides as close to concluding the agreement, and momentum continued with Chile's Foreign Minister visiting New Delhi in May 2026. Negotiations proceed through quarterly technical team meetings covering non-tariff barriers, sustainable supply chains, environmental protections, and labour standards.

Trade Composition

India's exports to Chile are unusually diversified for a relationship of this scale: motor vehicles, pharmaceutical formulations, chemicals, iron and steel products, textiles, auto components, electrical machinery, leather goods, rubber products, and footwear. Indian trade bodies, including CII and FICCI and sector specific export councils, have organized delegations and roadshows in Chile, with the ninth CII India-LAC Business Conclave in New Delhi in August 2023 drawing a high-level Chilean business delegation. Chile's exports globally are dominated by copper, close to a third of export value, alongside fruit, seafood, wood pulp, wine, and increasingly lithium, and India has been identified by Chilean trade analysts as an emerging, increasingly important destination, though this framework was unable to establish a precise bilateral breakdown of Chilean exports to India specifically and recommends this gap be addressed directly below.

Priority Actions

First, the two governments should publish a joint, reconciled trade statistics methodology, resolving the divergence between the Embassy of India's figures and other published estimates.

Second, the CEPA negotiations should maintain their current pace, with the four rounds completed by January 2026 protected against disruption from the political transition described in Political Cooperation.

Third, a detailed, product level study of Chilean exports to India should be commissioned, given the specific gap this framework identified in bilateral trade composition data.

Fourth, Indian export promotion in Chile should extend beyond delegations and roadshows toward permanent trade facilitation infrastructure, given the distance constraint identified in the Guiding Principles.

Fifth, the CEPA's unusually deep non-tariff coverage should be documented as a template potentially applicable to future Indian trade negotiations with other Latin American partners.

Sixth, both governments should establish measurable annual targets for expanding bilateral trade beyond the current concentration in a limited number of commodities, with particular attention to pharmaceuticals, engineering goods, processed food, information technology, renewable-energy products, and high-value manufactured goods. Regular monitoring would help ensure that trade growth becomes broader and more resilient.

Seventh, India and Chile should strengthen cooperation between customs authorities and trade facilitation agencies, including through digital documentation, faster clearance procedures, and greater exchange of information on regulatory requirements. Such measures would reduce transaction costs for businesses and make the benefits of an expanded CEPA more accessible to smaller exporters.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with India's Ministry of Commerce and Industry and Chile's Directorate General of International Economic Relations, SUBREI, operating through the CEPA negotiating teams. Read alongside Diplomatic Cooperation preceding it and Financial and Investment Cooperation that follow.

4. Financial Cooperation

Overview

Financial Cooperation is distinct from the trade and investment flows addressed in the surrounding pillars, concerned with the institutional architecture connecting the two countries' banking systems, capital markets, and financial regulators specifically. This is, on the evidence available, among the least developed pillars in the India-Chile relationship.

Current Status

This framework did not identify a dedicated bilateral financial cooperation mechanism between India and Chile comparable to the Financial Cooperation Forum this framework's companion document identified with the Republic of Korea, nor a payment interoperability arrangement of the kind connecting India's National Payments Corporation with counterparts elsewhere. The financial dimension currently visible is limited to the investment activity described in the next pillar, principally the state owned enterprise mineral partnerships, rather than broader banking or capital markets cooperation. Chile's own financial system is comparatively sophisticated by regional standards, anchored by the Santiago Stock Exchange and a well regarded pension and banking regulatory architecture, and this framework treats the absence of a dedicated bilateral mechanism as a gap in institutional attention, not a reflection of insufficient Chilean capacity.

An Underdeveloped Pillar by the Standards of This Framework

This framework states plainly that Financial Cooperation is not, at present, an area of active bilateral institution building. No dedicated financial dialogue, banking memorandum, or capital markets initiative was identified, and neither the April 2025 joint statement nor the CEPA rounds appear to address financial sector cooperation as a distinct workstream. This framework treats that absence as a genuine gap given the scale of mineral investment activity already underway, since the Coal India and Codelco-Hindustan Copper partnerships described next will, if they mature, generate exactly the kind of cross border financial flows, project financing, currency hedging, capital repatriation, that a dedicated mechanism would typically support.

Priority Actions

First, India's and Chile's Finance Ministries should establish a dedicated bilateral financial dialogue, distinct from the CEPA negotiations, addressing the project financing needs of the mineral partnerships.

Second, India's Export-Import Bank and Chilean development finance institutions should explore a coordination arrangement specific to the mining sector.

Third, the CEPA negotiations should explicitly incorporate a financial services chapter, addressing market access for banking, insurance, and capital markets.

Fourth, given Chile's internationally cited pension fund system, a dedicated knowledge exchange with India's own pension and savings institutions should be pursued.

Fifth, Financial Cooperation should be added as a standing agenda item for the Joint Commission's next review.

Sixth, both countries should explore mechanisms to facilitate cross-border investment and payment settlement, particularly for infrastructure, mining, renewable energy, and technology projects. Greater coordination between financial regulators and banking institutions could reduce transaction costs and provide businesses with more efficient channels for bilateral investment and trade.

Seventh, India and Chile should establish a structured dialogue on sustainable finance, focusing on green bonds, climate-related investment, renewable-energy financing, and environmental, social, and governance standards. This would help mobilize private capital for projects supporting the broader objectives of the bilateral partnership.

Eighth, both governments should encourage greater cooperation between their financial technology ecosystems, including digital payments, fintech regulation, and financial inclusion. Exchanges between regulators, banks, and technology companies could support innovation while ensuring that emerging financial technologies develop within secure and transparent regulatory frameworks.

Ninth, both countries should encourage regular exchanges between banks and financial institutions, including workshops and business forums to improve understanding of each other's financial systems, investment opportunities, and regulatory environments.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with India's Ministry of Finance and Reserve Bank of India, and Chile's Ministry of Finance and Central Bank of Chile. Read alongside Economic and Trade Cooperation preceding it and Investment Cooperation that follows.

5. Investment Cooperation

Overview

Investment Cooperation is, alongside Economic and Trade Cooperation, the pillar carrying the relationship's clearest current momentum, anchored by the critical minerals partnerships identified as the strategic core of this relationship's current phase.

Current Status

Coal India Limited's board approved a wholly owned Chilean holding company in February 2026, backed by an approved investment of 6,300 crore rupees, to explore critical mineral opportunities, and by August 2026 the company was reported to be evaluating acquisition of a Chile based lithium unit belonging to a Canadian mining firm, a joint application already filed with Chilean authorities. This is India's most substantial single investment commitment in Chile identified in this framework's research. A separate collaboration between Chile's state owned Codelco, the world's largest copper mining company, and India's Hindustan Copper Limited, agreed during President Boric's April 2025 visit, extends cooperation to copper specifically, sharing exploration technologies and processing expertise.

Both partnerships remain earlier stage than India's equivalent engagement in neighbouring Argentina, where Khanij Bidesh India Limited has already concluded a lithium exploration and exploitation agreement covering specific blocks, a considerably more advanced commercial stage than the Chilean partnerships, which remain oriented toward holding company formation and potential acquisition rather than concluded, block specific rights. This framework's Vision for the Two Nations treats this gap as the clearest available benchmark for the Chilean mineral partnerships' progress.

A Reciprocal but Underdeveloped Investment Ask

Investment interest is not directed solely from India toward Chile. President Boric used his April 2025 visit to state explicitly that Chile is seeking Indian investment into its own economy, across ports, airports, mining, railways, infrastructure, and renewable energy, an ambition that received considerably less public attention than the mineral partnerships. This framework did not identify specific Indian investment commitments responding to this ask comparable in scale to the Coal India or Codelco-Hindustan Copper partnerships, and treats this asymmetry, a clearly articulated Chilean request met so far with a less developed Indian response, as a distinct gap addressed separately below.

Priority Actions

First, Coal India's Chilean holding company should move from exploratory evaluation toward a specific, announced transaction within a defined timeframe.

Second, the Codelco-Hindustan Copper collaboration should expand from technology sharing toward a defined joint exploration or investment structure.

Third, India should develop a specific, publicly stated response to President Boric's stated interest in Indian investment into Chilean ports, airports, railways, and renewable energy.

Fourth, Invest India and InvestChile should establish a dedicated bilateral track specifically for infrastructure and renewable energy, distinct from the mineral sector track.

Fifth, both governments should track and publish investment figures with the same numerical discipline recommended for trade statistics, given no consolidated bilateral investment figure was identified.

Sixth, both countries should encourage greater participation by private-sector investors in infrastructure and energy projects, including through investment forums, business-matching programmes, and clearer information on project opportunities. This would help broaden investment beyond large state-linked enterprises and create opportunities for medium-sized companies.

Seventh, India and Chile should establish a mechanism to identify and address regulatory or administrative barriers faced by investors, with Invest India and InvestChile providing coordinated support from initial project identification through approvals and implementation. This would improve investor confidence and reduce delays in commercially viable projects.

Eighth, investment cooperation should give greater attention to technology transfer and local value addition, ensuring that major projects contribute to skills development, employment, research, and domestic industrial capacity in both countries.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with India's Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade and Ministry of Mines, and Chile's Ministry of Mining and InvestChile, with Coal India, Hindustan Copper, and Codelco as the principal industrial partners. Read alongside Financial Cooperation preceding it and Energy Cooperation addressed later.

6. Energy Cooperation

Overview

Energy Cooperation is distinct from the critical minerals partnerships in Investment Cooperation, focused on renewable generation, green hydrogen, and the energy transition cooperation both countries have named as an emerging priority.

Current Status

Officials from both countries agreed, at the ninth round of Foreign Office Consultations in Santiago in November 2025, to diversify bilateral ties into emerging areas including green energy alongside digital public infrastructure and innovation, distinct from the mineral extraction focus dominating public discussion. This diversification has begun reaching the sub-national level: the government of Karnataka held discussions with a Chilean delegation in May 2026 covering renewable energy, including green hydrogen and sustainable industrial innovation, alongside marine biotechnology, aquaculture technologies, and AI applications, extending the state level pattern seen during President Boric's own visit to Karnataka.

This framework reads Chile's global leadership in solar potential, driven by the Atacama Desert's exceptional irradiance, and its emerging green hydrogen role, as a natural complement to India's National Green Hydrogen Mission, though no dedicated bilateral green hydrogen agreement or offtake arrangement was identified. The energy dimension currently exists primarily as named diversification intent rather than concluded projects, consistent with a pattern seen across several pillars of this document where sectors named consistently in joint statements have not yet produced the specific instruments that would move them into operational cooperation.

Priority Actions

First, the diversification intent from the ninth Foreign Office Consultations round should become a specific, named bilateral green hydrogen or renewable energy working group.

Second, Karnataka's engagement with Chile should be documented as a template and connected to the National Green Hydrogen Mission at the central level.

Third, a dedicated technical exchange between Indian and Chilean solar research institutions should be pursued, distinct from the mineral partnerships.

Fourth, the two governments should explore whether Chile's green hydrogen ambitions could support a bilateral offtake arrangement comparable to those India has pursued elsewhere.

Fifth, energy cooperation should be explicitly linked to the critical minerals partnerships, given how energy intensive lithium and copper processing are.

Sixth, both countries should establish a joint programme on renewable-energy technology and grid integration, focusing on solar power, energy storage, smart grids, and efficient transmission systems. Technical exchanges between Indian and Chilean energy institutions could support the deployment of renewable energy while addressing the challenges associated with integrating variable power sources.

Seventh, India and Chile should encourage private-sector partnerships in green hydrogen and clean-energy projects, providing investors with clearer information on project pipelines, regulatory requirements, and potential markets. Such cooperation could help convert government-level commitments into commercially viable projects.

Eighth, both governments should explore cooperation on energy storage and battery technologies, particularly given the connection between Chile's lithium resources and India's growing electric mobility and renewable-energy sectors. Joint research, technology partnerships, and investment could strengthen the broader clean-energy value chain.

Ninth, energy cooperation should include regular monitoring of agreed projects and targets, with progress reviewed through the Joint Commission or a dedicated working group. This would help identify delays early and ensure that renewable-energy cooperation develops through measurable outcomes rather than remaining primarily at the level of stated ambition.

Tenth, both countries should promote cooperation in energy-efficiency technologies, particularly for industry, buildings, and transport, through technical exchanges and pilot projects.

Eleventh, India and Chile should encourage academic and industry exchanges in renewable-energy skills, helping develop a trained workforce capable of supporting future clean-energy projects and investments.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with India's Ministry of New and Renewable Energy and Chile's Ministry of Energy, supported by state counterparts including Karnataka. Read alongside Investment Cooperation preceding it and Defence and Security Cooperation that follows.

7. Defence and Security Cooperation

Overview

Defence and Security Cooperation rests on a standing formal agreement and a concrete, if modest, transactional history, a foundation this framework finds more substantial than the still developing mineral partnerships, even though it receives considerably less public attention.

Current Status

A formal defence cooperation agreement is already in place, referenced explicitly during President Boric's April 2025 visit, when the two leaders encouraged further work on capacity building and defence industrial collaboration under the existing framework. This rests on a concrete transactional history: the Chilean Navy purchased a support vessel from India in 2020, and Larsen and Toubro previously supplied a naval ship to Chile, a track record predating the broader diplomatic acceleration this framework has documented since 2025.

This history gained renewed attention when Chile's Foreign Minister, Alberto van Klaveren, visited India and emphasized strengthening defence ties, with discussions covering military technology and equipment as part of a broader Chilean modernization strategy. This framework reads Chile's interest as extending beyond further procurement toward joint venture and industrial collaboration, following a co-production logic similar to that recommended for minerals. This framework also notes that defence is one of the few pillars where India occupies the position of established supplier and Chile the position of buyer and modernization partner, a role reversal relative to the mineral pillars, worth naming as evidence of a genuinely two directional relationship rather than one organized entirely around Indian resource needs.

Priority Actions

First, the existing defence cooperation agreement should be reviewed and updated to reflect the specific priorities identified during the April 2025 visit.

Second, India's defence public sector undertakings and private manufacturers should be connected systematically with Chilean naval modernization requirements, building on the 2020 and Larsen and Toubro precedents.

Third, a specific joint venture or technology transfer arrangement in at least one platform category should be explored, following the co-production logic applied to minerals.

Fourth, defence cooperation should be formally linked to the maritime security considerations addressed in the next pillar.

Fifth, a regular, ideally annual, defence dialogue distinct from the broader Foreign Office Consultations should sustain momentum beyond the periods immediately surrounding high level visits.

Sixth, both countries should expand cooperation in defence training and professional exchanges, including naval training, military education, humanitarian assistance, and disaster-response exercises. Such exchanges would strengthen institutional familiarity and improve interoperability without requiring major new procurement commitments.

Seventh, India and Chile should explore cooperation in defence maintenance, repair, and technical support, particularly for naval platforms and related equipment. Indian expertise in cost-effective maintenance could provide practical opportunities for long-term industrial cooperation.

Eighth, both sides should strengthen cooperation in maritime surveillance and coastal security, including information-sharing, search and rescue, and maritime-domain awareness. This would complement existing naval engagement while supporting broader security objectives in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

Ninth, the two governments should encourage greater interaction between defence research institutions and industry, particularly in areas such as unmanned systems, communications, cybersecurity, and maritime technologies. Joint workshops and technical exchanges could identify practical opportunities for future cooperation.

Tenth, both countries should establish a structured exchange between defence academies and military research institutions, enabling officers, researchers, and technical specialists to share expertise and study each other's defence systems and strategic perspectives.

Eleventh, India and Chile should strengthen cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster-response operations, including joint training and coordination between relevant defence and civilian agencies.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with India's Ministry of Defence and Chile's Ministry of National Defence. Read alongside Energy Cooperation preceding it and Maritime and Blue Economy Cooperation that follows.

8. Maritime and Blue Economy Cooperation

Overview

Maritime and Blue Economy Cooperation connects Chile's distinctive geography, the longest country in the world, an extensive maritime boundary, and a significant Antarctic territorial presence, to India's own growing maritime and Southern Ocean interests. This framework treats the pillar's commercial dimension as more developed than any operational naval exercise relationship, a different profile from what this framework's companion document found with the Republic of Korea.

Current Status

The clearest maritime cooperation identified is industrial rather than operational: the 2020 vessel sale and the earlier Larsen and Toubro supply described in the preceding pillar. No dedicated bilateral naval exercise or joint patrol arrangement, comparable to those India maintains with several Asian and Pacific partners, was identified, a gap this framework attributes partly to distance.

Beyond the naval industrial dimension, blue economy cooperation, fisheries, aquaculture, marine biotechnology, is emerging rather than established. Karnataka's May 2026 discussions with Chile specifically identified marine biotechnology and aquaculture technologies as areas of potential collaboration, reflecting Chile's globally significant salmon industry and India's own growing blue economy interest, though this remains an early indicator rather than an established programme.

Priority Actions

First, the two navies should explore a structured, modest naval engagement programme beyond commercial transactions, perhaps beginning with officer exchange rather than a full exercise.

Second, the marine biotechnology and aquaculture cooperation identified through Karnataka should be assessed for national level replication, given Chile's salmon aquaculture expertise.

Third, India's defence shipbuilders should be connected proactively with Chilean naval modernization needs, per the preceding pillar's recommendation.

Fourth, given Chile's Antarctic Treaty System leadership, maritime cooperation should extend to Southern Ocean fisheries management and conservation.

Fifth, a dedicated feasibility study on blue economy investment, distinct from terrestrial mineral priorities, should give this pillar its own institutional identity.

Sixth, both countries should strengthen cooperation in maritime scientific research, including ocean observation, marine ecosystems, coastal mapping, and climate-related ocean studies. Joint research missions and academic exchanges could improve understanding of the marine environments surrounding both countries.

Seventh, India and Chile should explore cooperation in sustainable fisheries management, including monitoring technologies, responsible fishing practices, seafood traceability, and prevention of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. This could provide practical benefits to both countries' fishing industries.

Eighth, both governments should encourage private-sector partnerships in aquaculture and marine technology, particularly in areas such as sustainable fish farming, cold-chain systems, disease management, and processing technologies. Chilean expertise and Indian market opportunities could provide a strong basis for commercial cooperation.

Ninth, India and Chile should promote cooperation in maritime education and skills development, including exchanges between marine universities, fisheries institutes, naval academies, and maritime training centres. Such exchanges would strengthen human-resource capacity across the broader blue economy.

Tenth, both countries should establish an annual India–Chile Maritime and Blue Economy Dialogue bringing together government agencies, researchers, naval representatives, businesses, and coastal stakeholders to review progress and identify new opportunities for cooperation.

Eleventh, India and Chile should explore cooperation in sustainable port and coastal infrastructure, including green ports, efficient logistics, waste management, and renewable-energy systems. Sharing technical expertise and developing small-scale pilot projects could improve maritime connectivity while supporting environmentally responsible coastal development.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with the Indian Navy and Chilean Navy for security and industrial matters, and India's Ministry of Fisheries, Animal Husbandry and Dairying and Chile's Undersecretariat for Fisheries and Aquaculture for blue economy matters. Read alongside Defence and Security Cooperation preceding it and Water Resources Cooperation that follows.

9. Water Resources Cooperation

Overview

Water Resources Cooperation is, on the evidence available, among the least developed pillars in this relationship, notwithstanding a shared severity of relevance on both sides that makes the current absence of cooperation particularly notable.

Current Status

No dedicated bilateral water resources agreement, technical programme, or working group was identified. This absence is striking given that Chile's mining industry, the sector anchoring this relationship's current strategic priority, is among the most water intensive industries operating in one of the driest regions on earth, the Atacama Desert, where lithium and copper extraction compete directly with agricultural and municipal needs amid chronic scarcity. India manages severe water stress across large parts of its own territory and has developed extensive expertise in water efficient irrigation, desalination, and industrial recycling directly relevant to the mining operations Indian state enterprises are now pursuing in Chile.

This framework treats the absence of water resources cooperation as particularly consequential precisely because it sits close to the relationship's central strategic priority rather than at its periphery. Unlike several other underdeveloped pillars, where the connection to the mineral logic is comparatively indirect, water scarcity in the Atacama region is a direct, material input cost and operational risk for the very lithium and copper projects this framework's Investment Cooperation pillar treats as the relationship's most advanced current activity. This framework reads water resources cooperation not as a peripheral addition but as a technical prerequisite for those partnerships succeeding on sustainable terms.

Priority Actions

First, India's Ministry of Jal Shakti and Chile's water authorities should establish a dedicated bilateral memorandum on water resources management.

Second, water efficient mining technology should be explicitly built into the terms of the Coal India and Codelco-Hindustan Copper partnerships from the outset, not addressed reactively.

Third, Indian desalination and water recycling expertise should be offered specifically to Chilean mining and municipal authorities in the Atacama region.

Fourth, water resources should be added as a named agenda item at the next Foreign Office Consultations round.

Fifth, water cooperation should be developed jointly with Agriculture and Food Security Cooperation, given the direct relevance of efficient irrigation to both countries' agricultural water challenges.

Sixth, both countries should establish a joint programme on climate-resilient water management, focusing on drought preparedness, groundwater conservation, flood management, and water-security planning. Sharing technical expertise and best practices could help both countries respond more effectively to increasing climate-related pressures on water resources.

Seventh, India and Chile should promote cooperation in smart water technologies, including digital monitoring, remote sensing, leak detection, and data-based water management. Pilot projects could demonstrate how technology can improve efficiency in urban, agricultural, and industrial water systems.

Eighth, both governments should encourage research collaboration between universities and water-management institutions, particularly on desalination, wastewater treatment, recycling, and sustainable mining practices. Joint research programmes could generate solutions adapted to the distinct water challenges faced by both countries.

Ninth, water cooperation should include capacity-building and technical training, allowing engineers, water managers, researchers, and policymakers from both countries to participate in specialised workshops and institutional exchanges. This would strengthen long-term professional networks and knowledge-sharing.

Tenth, India and Chile should establish an annual water cooperation review mechanism to assess progress on agreed projects, identify implementation gaps, and develop priorities for the following year. This would ensure that water cooperation develops beyond individual agreements into a sustained bilateral programme.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with India's Ministry of Jal Shakti and Chile's General Directorate of Water. Read alongside Maritime and Blue Economy Cooperation preceding it and Agriculture and Food Security Cooperation that follows

10. Agriculture and Food Security Cooperation

Overview

Agriculture and Food Security Cooperation has been named consistently across the relationship's institutional readouts, reaffirmed at both the 2024 Joint Commission Meeting and the 2025 Foreign Office Consultations, though this framework finds the pillar's specific content less developed than its consistent mention suggests.

Current Status

President Boric identified agribusiness explicitly as a shared growth opportunity during his April 2025 visit, and agriculture has appeared as a named sector in nearly every high level readout reviewed, from the 2020 Joint Commission discussions through 2024 and 2025. Chile's agricultural export profile, dominated globally by fruit, cherries, grapes, blueberries, apples, alongside a globally significant wine industry, offers clear complementarity with Indian trade interests, though no specific bilateral agricultural technology transfer programme, phytosanitary agreement, or trade facilitation instrument distinct from the general PTA and pending CEPA provisions was identified.

This framework also notes discussion, during the 2020 Joint Commission engagement, of a memorandum on generic medicines exports from India to Chile, reported then as in its final stages, whose current status this framework could not confirm from more recent sources. Food security specifically, as distinct from agricultural trade, has received even less institutional attention, despite both countries facing distinct but serious considerations, India in feeding a very large population, Chile in climate pressure on its water intensive fruit and wine export industries, the same industries exposed to the Atacama region's scarcity described in the preceding pillar.

Priority Actions

First, the two governments should confirm the status of the 2020 generic medicines memorandum, finalizing or documenting it.

Second, a dedicated phytosanitary cooperation agreement should be pursued within the CEPA negotiations, addressing the technical barriers typical of agricultural trade between distant partners.

Third, an agricultural technology exchange should connect Indian irrigation expertise with Chilean fruit and wine production expertise.

Fourth, the agribusiness opportunity Boric identified should become a specific, named working group rather than remaining a recurring line in joint statements.

Fifth, Chilean wine exports to India should be specifically addressed within the CEPA negotiations, a clear Chilean export interest not explicitly referenced in the negotiating priorities described in Economic and Trade Cooperation.

Sixth, both countries should promote cooperation in food processing and cold-chain infrastructure, particularly for fruits, seafood, dairy products, and other perishable commodities. Joint investment and technology exchanges could reduce post-harvest losses and improve the quality and shelf life of agricultural products traded between the two countries.

Seventh, India and Chile should establish a joint agricultural research programme focusing on climate-resilient crops, precision agriculture, sustainable irrigation, and soil management. Research institutions from both countries could develop solutions adapted to water scarcity and changing climatic conditions.

Eighth, both governments should strengthen cooperation on agricultural standards and food safety, including laboratory testing, certification, traceability, and digital systems for verifying agricultural products. Greater regulatory understanding would help exporters meet each other's market requirements more efficiently.

Ninth, India and Chile should encourage greater participation of small and medium-sized agricultural enterprises in bilateral trade, through farmer-producer networks, business-matching programmes, and simplified market information. This would ensure that agricultural cooperation benefits a wider range of producers rather than remaining concentrated among large companies.

Tenth, the two countries should establish an annual India–Chile Agriculture and Food Security Dialogue bringing together government agencies, farmers, researchers, agribusinesses, and technology providers to review progress and identify new opportunities for cooperation.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with India's Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare and Chile's Ministry of Agriculture, supported by the Chilean Agricultural and Livestock Service. Read alongside Water Resources Cooperation preceding it and Science, Technology and Innovation Cooperation that follows.

11. Science, Technology and Innovation Cooperation

Overview

Science, Technology and Innovation Cooperation is the pillar in which this relationship's most genuinely distinctive activity, Antarctic scientific cooperation, is properly situated, and this framework treats it as the pillar's centrepiece rather than a peripheral mention.

Current Status

A Letter of Intent on Antarctic cooperation was signed during President Boric's April 2025 State Visit by India's Minister of Earth Sciences, connecting India's National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research with Chile's Antarctic Institute, INACH. This cooperation rests on a striking geographic complementarity, India's research presence concentrated in eastern Antarctica and Chile's in the western Antarctic Peninsula, allowing largely non-overlapping scientific coverage. The two institutions have identified climate change, geosciences, and microbiology as priority areas, with joint initiatives planned under the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting and the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, and officials have discussed joint research expeditions.

Beyond Antarctica, Science and Technology appears among the standing sectors covered by bilateral memoranda, and Chile's own international science posture offers a useful comparison. The European Union and Chile maintain a formal science cooperation agreement dating to 2002, renewed through 2027, and Chile is the only Latin American country associated with Eureka, the pan-European research funding network, entitled to lead and participate in its programmes. This framework reads Chile's demonstrated appetite for structured, treaty level science cooperation elsewhere as evidence that a comparably structured India-Chile agreement, beyond the Antarctic Letter of Intent, is realistic rather than aspirational.

Priority Actions

First, the Antarctic Letter of Intent should be converted into a binding agreement with a defined joint research programme and funding commitment on both sides.

Second, the first joint India-Chile Antarctic research expedition should be scheduled and publicly announced within a defined timeframe.

Third, India should explore a broader bilateral science agreement modelled on Chile's EU arrangement, extending beyond Antarctic science into geosciences, microbiology, and climate research.

Fourth, given Chile's Eureka association, India should explore whether Indian institutions and start-ups might access relevant programmes through Chilean partnership.

Fifth, Antarctic cooperation should receive a dedicated joint research fund, distinct from general science funding, reducing the risk it is deprioritized relative to the mineral and trade pillars.

Sixth, both countries should strengthen cooperation on Antarctic climate and environmental research, particularly in areas such as glacial change, ocean circulation, biodiversity, and the impacts of climate change. Joint data collection and scientific exchanges could improve understanding of the Southern Ocean and Antarctic ecosystem.

Seventh, India and Chile should establish regular exchanges between Antarctic research institutions and scientists, including fellowships, workshops, laboratory collaboration, and joint research publications. This would build sustained scientific networks rather than limiting cooperation to individual expeditions.

Eighth, both governments should explore cooperation in Antarctic logistics and scientific infrastructure, including research equipment, transportation, communications, and field-support capabilities. Sharing expertise could reduce costs and improve the effectiveness of future scientific missions.

Ninth, Antarctic cooperation should include greater participation by universities and young researchers, through scholarships, research internships, and specialised training programmes. This would help develop a new generation of scientists with expertise in polar and Southern Ocean research.

Tenth, India and Chile should establish an annual India–Chile Polar Science Dialogue to review ongoing research, coordinate future expeditions, identify funding priorities, and expand cooperation into emerging areas of polar science. This would give Antarctic cooperation a stable institutional mechanism alongside the broader bilateral relationship.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with India's Ministry of Earth Sciences and NCPOR, and Chile's Antarctic Institute and Ministry of Science, Technology, Knowledge and Innovation. Read alongside Agriculture and Food Security Cooperation preceding it and Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Technologies Cooperation that follows.

12. Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Technologies Cooperation

Overview

This is, on the evidence available, among the earliest stage pillars in the relationship, with activity so far concentrated at the sub-national rather than national government level.

Current Status

The clearest documented instance of AI cooperation occurred at the state level: the government of Karnataka held discussions with a visiting Chilean delegation in May 2026 that specifically included AI applications alongside renewable energy, marine biotechnology, and aquaculture technologies. No national government level AI cooperation agreement, joint task force, or dedicated dialogue was identified.

This framework reads the sub-national origin of this pillar's only concrete activity as consistent with a broader pattern across the relationship's newer, more technologically oriented pillars, in which state governments, Karnataka in particular, have moved faster than the national bilateral architecture. This differs from the pillars anchored in state owned enterprise activity, mining and defence prominently, where national institutions remain firmly in the lead. This framework treats the difference as instructive, suggesting emerging technology cooperation may be better served, initially, by empowering sub-national initiative rather than waiting for a comprehensive national framework agreement.

Priority Actions

First, Karnataka's AI engagement with Chile should be reported to and reviewed by the Foreign Office Consultations mechanism.

Second, India should proactively offer capacity building and knowledge exchange, given its own considerably more developed domestic AI policy architecture.

Third, AI cooperation should connect explicitly to the critical minerals partnerships, given AI's growing role in geological mapping and exploration.

Fourth, any future digital cooperation memorandum should explicitly include an AI component rather than treating the two as separate.

Fifth, given the early stage, this framework recommends starting with a modest goal, a single joint pilot or researcher exchange, rather than an ambitious framework agreement.

Eleventh, India and Chile should strengthen cooperation on Southern Ocean observation and monitoring, including ocean temperature, currents, biodiversity, and ecosystem changes. Joint scientific observations could contribute to a stronger evidence base for understanding the relationship between Antarctic processes and wider climate systems.

Twelfth, both countries should explore joint development and use of polar research technologies, including autonomous underwater vehicles, remote sensing systems, satellite-based monitoring, and advanced scientific sensors. Cooperation in these areas could strengthen research capabilities while creating opportunities for technology innovation.

Thirteenth, India and Chile should establish a shared digital platform for Antarctic research data, allowing participating institutions to exchange non-sensitive scientific datasets, research findings, environmental observations, and expedition records. Such a platform would improve collaboration and reduce duplication of research efforts.

Fourteenth, both governments should promote cooperation on Antarctic biodiversity and conservation, including research on marine ecosystems, wildlife populations, and the effects of human activity and climate change. Joint scientific initiatives could support evidence-based approaches to protecting the fragile Antarctic environment.

Fifteenth, India and Chile should develop joint training programmes in polar research and expedition management, covering field safety, scientific equipment, environmental protocols, emergency preparedness, and logistics. Such training would strengthen the practical capabilities required for sustained Antarctic research cooperation.

Sixteenth, both countries should explore opportunities for joint participation in international polar research initiatives, allowing Indian and Chilean institutions to collaborate with wider scientific networks while maintaining a clear bilateral research component. This would increase the international visibility and scientific impact of India–Chile Antarctic cooperation.

Seventeenth, India and Chile should encourage joint Antarctic publications and scientific conferences, enabling researchers from both countries to present findings, share methodologies, and develop new research partnerships.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with India's Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology and Chile's Ministry of Science, Technology, Knowledge and Innovation, with Karnataka providing an early foundation. Read alongside Science, Technology and Innovation Cooperation preceding it and Digital and Cyber Security Cooperation that follows.

13. Digital and Cyber Security Cooperation

Overview

This pillar combines India's interest in extending its digital public infrastructure model internationally with the cyber security cooperation needed to protect it, a combination this framework finds considerably less developed here than in India's more technologically advanced bilateral relationships.

Current Status

Digital public infrastructure was named explicitly during President Boric's April 2025 visit and reaffirmed at the ninth Foreign Office Consultations round. Prime Minister Modi personally offered to share India's expertise, alongside similar offers in renewable energy, railways, and space technology addressed elsewhere in this framework. India has, as of a July 2026 Lok Sabha reply, concluded DPI partnerships with 24 countries globally, though this framework could not confirm whether Chile is among them, and treats DPI cooperation with Chile as stated intention rather than concluded arrangement. No dedicated bilateral cyber security dialogue, threat sharing arrangement, or critical infrastructure protection cooperation was identified, a gap mirroring the one found in Financial Cooperation, since digital and financial infrastructure security are closely related. This framework treats the pillar's current state, a personal prime ministerial offer not yet formally taken up, as somewhat unusual among the gaps identified: the constraint does not appear to be lack of interest but the absence of follow up work needed to convert an offer into a signed instrument.

Priority Actions

First, the two governments should clarify whether Chile is among India's 24 DPI partnerships, and if not, prioritize concluding one.

Second, a bilateral cyber security dialogue should be established as a foundational step alongside any DPI partnership.

Third, India's DPI offer should be made concrete through a specific pilot project, potentially connected to the Financial Cooperation gaps identified earlier.

Fourth, digital cooperation should be coordinated with the AI cooperation described in the preceding pillar.

Fifth, both governments should set a specific, dated target for concluding a formal digital cooperation memorandum.

Sixth, India and Chile should establish a joint working group on digital public infrastructure, bringing together government technology agencies, financial institutions, and digital-service experts from both countries. The group could identify priority areas for cooperation and oversee the implementation of agreed pilot projects.

Seventh, both countries should explore cooperation in digital identity and secure authentication systems, particularly for public services, financial inclusion, and cross-border transactions. India can share relevant experience while Chile can assess applications suited to its own institutional and regulatory environment.

Eighth, India and Chile should strengthen cooperation on digital payments and fintech, including regulatory exchanges, interoperable payment systems, and secure cross-border transactions. Such cooperation could support trade, tourism, investment, and financial inclusion while complementing the broader economic partnership.

Ninth, both governments should promote digital skills and capacity-building programmes, particularly for public officials, students, entrepreneurs, and small businesses. Training in digital governance, cybersecurity, cloud technologies, and emerging technologies would help broaden participation in the digital economy.

Tenth, India and Chile should establish a bilateral mechanism for cooperation on data governance and digital regulation, including privacy, cybersecurity standards, cross-border data flows, and responsible use of emerging technologies. Regular regulatory exchanges could reduce uncertainty for businesses operating across both markets.

Eleventh, the two countries should encourage joint digital innovation projects involving universities, start-ups, and technology companies, focusing on practical applications in healthcare, agriculture, education, disaster management, and sustainable cities. This would ensure that digital cooperation generates tangible benefits beyond government-to-government engagement.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with India's Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology and Chile's Ministry of Science, Technology, Knowledge and Innovation, with India's CERT as the natural technical anchor for future cyber security dialogue. Read alongside AI and Emerging Technologies Cooperation preceding it and Space Cooperation that follows.

14. Space Cooperation

Overview

Space Cooperation sits alongside Antarctic science as one of the more distinctive potential dimensions of this relationship, given Chile's position as host to some of the world's most scientifically significant astronomical observatories, though the bilateral, India-Chile specific dimension is considerably less developed than Chile's broader astronomical significance might suggest.

Current Status

Outer Space appears explicitly among the sectors named in the standing bilateral memoranda, and Prime Minister Modi personally offered to share India's space technology expertise during the April 2025 visit. ISRO maintains cooperation agreements with a broad network of international partners and Chile has appeared among them, though no specific, dated joint mission, satellite launch, or ground station arrangement was identified.

This framework treats Chile's position as host to major international astronomical facilities, large radio and optical observatories operated through European and other international consortiums, drawn to the Atacama Desert's exceptional conditions, as a significant, currently unrealized opportunity for Indian participation, distinct from but complementary to direct India-Chile space agency cooperation. No Indian institutional participation in these facilities was identified.

Priority Actions

First, ISRO and Chile's relevant authorities should convert the general cooperation named in bilateral memoranda into a specific, dated agreement with at least one concrete joint activity.

Second, given Modi's personal offer, a specific follow up initiative, potentially satellite based earth observation relevant to Chile's mining and agricultural monitoring, should proceed within a defined timeframe.

Third, India should explore Indian scientific participation in Chile's major international astronomical facilities.

Fourth, space cooperation should link explicitly to the Antarctic cooperation described in the preceding pillar, given the relevance of earth observation to polar research.

Fifth, any future agreement should include an explicit disaster management and remote sensing component, given Chile's seismic and volcanic activity.

Sixth, India and Chile should establish a joint working group on satellite applications, focusing on practical uses of space technology in agriculture, mining, environmental monitoring, urban planning, and natural-resource management. This would help translate existing scientific goodwill into commercially and socially useful applications.

Seventh, both countries should explore cooperation in satellite-based disaster early-warning systems, particularly for earthquakes, volcanic activity, floods, wildfires, and other natural hazards. Indian satellite capabilities and Chilean expertise in disaster-risk management could support stronger preparedness and emergency response.

Eighth, India and Chile should encourage greater collaboration between universities and space research institutions, including student exchanges, joint research projects, fellowships, and technical workshops. Such programmes would help develop a new generation of scientists and engineers with experience in international space cooperation.

Ninth, both governments should explore opportunities for Indian and Chilean private space companies to cooperate, particularly in satellite manufacturing, remote sensing, launch services, data applications, and space-based communications. This could broaden the partnership beyond government agencies and encourage commercial innovation.

Tenth, India and Chile should establish an annual India–Chile Space Cooperation Dialogue to review progress under existing agreements, identify new areas of collaboration, and coordinate participation in international space initiatives. A regular institutional mechanism would help ensure that space cooperation develops continuously rather than around individual high-level visits.

Eleventh, India and Chile should promote cooperation in satellite-based climate and environmental monitoring, using Earth observation data to track glaciers, forests, water resources, coastal changes, and agricultural conditions. Joint research and data-sharing initiatives could support sustainable development and strengthen both countries' capacity to respond to environmental challenges.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with ISRO and Chile's relevant national space and scientific authorities. Read alongside Digital and Cyber Security Cooperation preceding it and Environmental and Climate Cooperation that follows.

15. Environmental and Climate Cooperation

Overview

This pillar is distinct from Energy Cooperation, focused on climate policy alignment and environmental protection rather than the underlying energy technologies addressed earlier.

Current Status

President Boric explicitly connected the relationship's critical mineral cooperation to global climate change objectives during his April 2025 visit, framing lithium and copper as materials essential to the global energy transition rather than conventional commodities alone. Beyond this framing, no dedicated bilateral climate agreement, joint decarbonization initiative, or environmental protection memorandum specific to India and Chile was identified, distinct from the general environmental protections incorporated into the CEPA negotiations. Both countries participate actively in multilateral climate processes, including through events such as India Climate Week, though no Chile specific bilateral outcomes from these broader engagements were identified. This framework treats the gap between Boric's rhetorical framing and the absence of a dedicated climate instrument as consistent with a broader pattern documented across several pillars, in which a compelling diplomatic narrative has developed well ahead of the institutional mechanisms that would give it operational substance.

Priority Actions

First, the climate dimension attached to critical minerals cooperation should be formalized through an explicit statement connecting the Coal India and Codelco-Hindustan Copper partnerships to measurable climate objectives.

Second, the environmental protections already incorporated into the CEPA negotiations should be made public in sufficient detail for independent assessment.

Third, a dedicated bilateral initiative on mining sector environmental standards, particularly water use, should be explored, connecting directly to the Water Resources Cooperation pillar.

Fourth, India and Chile should identify specific climate cooperation opportunities within multilateral forums where both are already active.

Fifth, environmental and climate cooperation should become a standing agenda item at future Foreign Office Consultations rounds.

Sixth, India and Chile should establish a dedicated bilateral programme on renewable energy and climate-resilient infrastructure, focusing on solar power, energy storage, green hydrogen, sustainable transport, and resilient urban systems. Joint projects could demonstrate how climate objectives can be integrated into wider economic cooperation.

Seventh, both countries should strengthen cooperation on climate-related scientific research, including glacier monitoring, drought assessment, ocean studies, biodiversity, and extreme-weather patterns. Universities and research institutions could undertake joint studies and exchange scientific data to improve climate-risk assessment.

Eighth, India and Chile should develop cooperation on carbon markets and emissions monitoring, including exchanges on carbon accounting, measurement methodologies, and market mechanisms. Such cooperation could support greater transparency while helping industries prepare for evolving international climate-related trade requirements.

Ninth, both governments should promote sustainable mining practices through joint research and technology exchanges, focusing on energy efficiency, water conservation, waste management, land restoration, and responsible mineral processing. This would strengthen the environmental foundation of the growing critical-minerals partnership.

Tenth, India and Chile should establish a climate-focused innovation programme connecting start-ups, universities, and businesses from both countries. Priority areas could include clean technology, climate-smart agriculture, water conservation, renewable energy, and environmental monitoring, helping translate research and innovation into practical solutions.

Eleventh, both countries should establish an annual India–Chile Climate and Environmental Dialogue to review progress, identify new cooperation opportunities, and coordinate positions in relevant international forums. Regular institutional review would help ensure that climate cooperation develops alongside, rather than behind, the rapidly expanding economic relationship.

Twelfth, India and Chile should encourage regular exchanges between environmental agencies and experts, focusing on best practices in conservation, climate adaptation, pollution control, and sustainable resource management.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with India's Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change and Chile's Ministry of Environment. Read alongside Space Cooperation preceding it and Disaster Management and Humanitarian Cooperation addressed later.

16. Disaster Management and Humanitarian Cooperation

Overview

This is, in this framework's assessment, among the most naturally complementary pillars in the entire India-Chile relationship, resting on a genuine, already signed agreement and a striking pairing of national expertise few of India's other partnerships can match.

Current Status

India and Chile signed a disaster management cooperation agreement during President Boric's April 2025 State Visit, the same visit that produced the Antarctic scientific cooperation described earlier. This rests on genuinely complementary expertise. Chile is among the most experienced countries in the world in earthquake and tsunami preparedness, a legacy shaped by the 1960 earthquake off its coast, still the most powerful ever recorded, which prompted UNESCO's Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission to establish the Pacific Tsunami Warning System in 1965. Chile remains active in UNESCO's International Platform for Reducing Earthquake Disaster, and its earthquake resistant building codes are internationally cited as a model. Chile has also developed its own South-South disaster cooperation, training Caribbean disaster agencies in earthquake and tsunami preparedness through its own international cooperation agency.

India brings a complementary strength: the National Disaster Response Force and National Disaster Management Authority, established under the Disaster Management Act of 2005, have built capacity across floods, cyclones, and seismic risk, and India has positioned itself as a regional first responder, extending assistance to Türkiye and Syria after the February 2023 earthquake. This framework reads Chile's globally recognized earthquake and tsunami specialization alongside India's broader multi-hazard capacity as genuinely complementary rather than redundant expertise.

Priority Actions

First, the April 2025 agreement should be operationalized through a specific joint training programme drawing on Chile's earthquake and tsunami expertise and India's NDRF's broader multi-hazard experience.

Second, given Chile's leading role in earthquake resistant building codes, India should pursue a technical exchange on seismic standards, directly relevant to India's own growing seismic risk.

Third, India should explore participation in or structured learning from the Pacific Tsunami Warning System, given its relevance to India's own coastline and Indian Ocean tsunami risk.

Fourth, Chile's South-South disaster cooperation model should be examined as a template for trilateral cooperation, India and Chile jointly supporting third country disaster preparedness.

Fifth, given this pillar's naturally complementary expertise, it should be prioritized for early, visible implementation as a comparatively low cost, high symbolic value demonstration that agreements can move to operational activity.

Sixth, both countries should establish regular joint exercises and simulation-based training for earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, wildfires, and other major disasters. Participation by emergency responders, local authorities, medical teams, and technical experts would strengthen coordination and allow both sides to test practical response procedures.

Seventh, India and Chile should strengthen cooperation in disaster early-warning technologies, including satellite monitoring, seismic sensors, tsunami detection, and emergency communication systems. Sharing technical knowledge could improve preparedness and reduce response times during major natural disasters.

Eighth, both governments should develop a dedicated exchange programme for disaster-management professionals, including NDRF personnel, Chilean emergency responders, engineers, scientists, and local administrators. Regular institutional exchanges would encourage practical knowledge-sharing and strengthen professional networks.

Ninth, India and Chile should cooperate on community-level disaster preparedness, particularly through public awareness campaigns, evacuation planning, school safety programmes, and first-aid training. Such initiatives would ensure that disaster resilience extends beyond government agencies to local communities.

Tenth, both countries should establish an annual India–Chile Disaster Management Dialogue to review training programmes, identify emerging risks, share lessons from recent disasters, and develop priorities for future cooperation. This would provide a stable institutional mechanism for implementing the 2025 agreement.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with India's NDMA and NDRF, and Chile's National Emergency Office, ONEMI, part of the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security. Read alongside Environmental and Climate Cooperation preceding it and Infrastructure and Connectivity Cooperation that follows.

17. Infrastructure and Connectivity Cooperation

Overview

This pillar confronts the most extreme version of the distance constraint identified in the Guiding Principles, since India and Chile sit at close to antipodal positions on the globe.

Current Status

No direct commercial air route between India and Chile was identified, and given the near maximal distance involved, this framework treats indirect routing through hubs in Europe, North America, or the Middle East as a structural feature of travel between the two countries, not a temporary gap likely closed by a future nonstop service, unlike the single India-Korea route this framework's companion document treated as correctable. Prime Minister Modi offered to share India's railways expertise during the April 2025 visit, alongside the digital, energy, and space offers described elsewhere, though no specific bilateral railways project or agreement was identified as having resulted from it.

Priority Actions

First, given the improbability of direct air connectivity, both governments should focus on optimizing indirect routing and easing visa and logistics friction, rather than pursuing nonstop service as a near term goal.

Second, Modi's railways offer should become a specific technical cooperation project, potentially connected to mining sector logistics needs for moving mineral output to export ports.

Third, infrastructure cooperation should prioritize digital and virtual connectivity mechanisms over physical travel wherever feasible, building on the virtual format already used for the first Joint Commission Meeting in 2020.

Fourth, given Chile's stated interest in Indian investment into its ports, airports, and railways, infrastructure investment should be treated as distinct from technical cooperation, with Indian firms encouraged to bid on relevant projects.

Fifth, this framework recommends a realistic assessment of connectivity's practical ceiling, measuring success by indirect connection efficiency and virtual engagement rather than metrics like nonstop flight frequency that do not apply uniformly across geography.

Eleventh, India and Chile should develop joint research on climate-related disaster risks, particularly the increasing frequency and intensity of floods, wildfires, droughts, landslides, and extreme weather events. Research institutions could exchange data and methodologies to improve national and regional disaster-risk assessments.

Twelfth, both countries should strengthen cooperation in emergency medical response, including disaster triage, field hospitals, emergency logistics, and trauma care. Exchanges between Indian and Chilean medical response teams could improve preparedness for large-scale emergencies and strengthen humanitarian cooperation.

Thirteenth, India and Chile should explore cooperation in disaster-resilient infrastructure, particularly the design and construction of earthquake-resistant buildings, bridges, hospitals, schools, and critical facilities. Technical exchanges could help both countries incorporate stronger resilience standards into infrastructure planning.

Fourteenth, both governments should establish a joint disaster-management technology programme, encouraging start-ups and research institutions to develop tools for early warning, emergency mapping, rescue operations, and crisis communication. This could connect disaster management with the wider technology and innovation pillars of the bilateral framework.

Fifteenth, India and Chile should strengthen cooperation in wildfire prevention and response, including satellite-based monitoring, fire-risk mapping, emergency communications, and specialised firefighting techniques. Chile's experience with large-scale wildfires could provide valuable lessons for Indian states facing increasing wildfire risks.

Sixteenth, both countries should establish a shared repository of disaster-management knowledge and best practices, containing training materials, response protocols, case studies, and lessons learned from major disasters. Regularly updating this repository would support continuous institutional learning and make bilateral expertise more accessible to emergency-management authorities.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with India's Ministry of Civil Aviation and Ministry of Railways, and Chile's Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications. Read alongside Disaster Management and Humanitarian Cooperation preceding it and Industrial and Manufacturing Cooperation that follows.

18. Industrial and Manufacturing Cooperation

Overview

This pillar overlaps substantially with the mineral partnerships already examined in Investment Cooperation, and this framework treats that overlap directly rather than constructing an artificially separate account of manufacturing cooperation this relationship does not currently possess.

Current Status

The clearest industrial activity is the mineral sector partnerships already described, Coal India's Chilean holding company and the Codelco-Hindustan Copper collaboration, properly understood as extractive and processing cooperation rather than manufacturing in the finished goods sense. No manufacturing cooperation comparable to the automotive or electronics partnerships found in India's more industrially integrated relationships was identified. Chile's own economy remains heavily weighted toward commodity export with comparatively light manufacturing, a structural constraint on how much distinct manufacturing cooperation this relationship can realistically develop in its current phase.

Priority Actions

First, the mineral partnerships should be deliberately extended up the value chain, from raw extraction toward processing within Chile, addressing President Boric's own stated ambition directly.

Second, India's pharmaceutical manufacturing sector should be explored for Chilean market access or manufacturing partnership, building on the generic medicines cooperation described in the next pillar.

Third, given Chile's light manufacturing base, Indian manufacturers already familiar with Latin American entry, automotive components and pharmaceuticals prominently, should be encouraged to consider Chile as a market.

Fourth, future mineral processing investment should commit to specific, measurable local value addition targets within Chile, converting the reciprocity principle into concrete industrial policy.

Fifth, this pillar's priority actions should be periodically reassessed as the mineral partnerships mature, since a shift toward processing within Chile would fundamentally change its scope.

Sixth, India and Chile should establish a dedicated industrial value-chain working group to identify sectors where Indian manufacturing capabilities and Chilean resource advantages can be combined. Priority areas could include mineral processing, renewable-energy equipment, pharmaceuticals, engineering goods, and advanced materials, with specific projects identified for joint development.

Seventh, both countries should encourage technology transfer and skills development alongside new industrial investments, ensuring that Chilean facilities benefit from Indian technical expertise while creating local employment and specialised capabilities. Training programmes and industry-academic partnerships could support the development of a skilled workforce for emerging manufacturing sectors.

Eighth, India and Chile should explore joint ventures in clean-technology manufacturing, particularly equipment connected to solar energy, green hydrogen, batteries, and electric mobility. Such cooperation could link Chile's mineral resources with India's growing manufacturing capabilities and create greater value within the bilateral economic relationship.

Ninth, both governments should facilitate partnerships between Indian and Chilean small and medium enterprises, particularly through business-matching programmes, industrial exhibitions, and sector-specific investment forums. Greater SME participation would broaden industrial cooperation beyond major corporations and encourage more diversified economic engagement.

Tenth, Chilean industrial parks and special economic zones should be evaluated for potential Indian investment, particularly by companies seeking a platform for wider Latin American markets. Coordinated investment facilitation could help Indian manufacturers assess infrastructure, logistics, regulatory conditions, and market-access opportunities.

Eleventh, both countries should establish measurable industrial cooperation targets, including investment commitments, local employment, technology transfer, processing capacity, and manufactured exports. Annual monitoring through the Joint Commission would help determine whether industrial cooperation is generating sustained value addition rather than remaining concentrated in resource extraction.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with India's Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade and Ministry of Mines, and Chile's Ministry of Economy, Development and Tourism, with substantial overlap with Investment Cooperation's institutional responsibility. Read alongside Infrastructure and Connectivity Cooperation preceding it and Academic and Educational Cooperation that follows.

19. Academic and Educational Cooperation

Overview

Academic and Educational Cooperation currently rests primarily on a single identifiable channel, Chilean government scholarship provision to Indian students, rather than the dense, multi-institutional university network found in several of India's other bilateral relationships.

Current Status

The Chilean Agency for International Cooperation and Development, AGCID, offers scholarships open to students from developing countries, including India, for master's study in Chile, covering tuition, stipend, and health insurance. Chilean universities offer programmes of particular relevance elsewhere in this framework, agricultural and food sciences, and medicine and public health with a regional focus. No dedicated India-Chile university partnership network, exchange programme, or joint degree arrangement comparable to India's academic cooperation with several Asian partners was identified.

Priority Actions

First, AGCID scholarship availability to Indian students should be actively publicized within India, given how little public attention this real, accessible channel currently receives.

Second, given Chilean universities' strength in agricultural and food sciences, including wine production, a dedicated academic partnership should connect Indian agricultural universities with Chilean counterparts.

Third, India should establish a reciprocal scholarship channel for Chilean students, addressing what is currently a one directional academic relationship.

Fourth, given the Antarctic cooperation described earlier, a dedicated researcher and graduate exchange programme in polar science should connect NCPOR with Chilean Antarctic institutions.

Fifth, future university partnerships should explicitly address the practical logistics of study abroad given the extreme distance, rather than assuming the low friction mobility that characterizes India's closer academic relationships.

Sixth, India and Chile should establish a dedicated India–Chile Higher Education and Research Forum, bringing together universities, research institutions, policymakers, and academic administrators from both countries. The forum could identify priority disciplines, develop institutional partnerships, and review progress in student and faculty mobility.

Seventh, both countries should promote joint research programmes in areas of shared strategic interest, including critical minerals, renewable energy, climate science, agriculture, biotechnology, digital technologies, and disaster management. Joint grants and collaborative publications could encourage deeper academic cooperation beyond student exchanges.

Eighth, Indian and Chilean universities should expand cooperation in language and cultural studies, including Spanish language programmes in India and opportunities for Indian languages and cultural studies in Chile. Greater language familiarity would reduce an important barrier to long-term academic and people-to-people engagement.

Ninth, both governments should encourage short-term academic exchanges and virtual programmes as a complement to full semester or degree mobility. Online lectures, joint classrooms, virtual research projects, and short study visits could provide more accessible opportunities for students given the considerable distance and travel costs between the two countries.

Tenth, India and Chile should create a dedicated pathway for academic-industry collaboration, connecting universities with companies working in pharmaceuticals, mining, renewable energy, agriculture, technology, and manufacturing. Internships, applied research projects, and industry-sponsored programmes could help convert academic cooperation into practical economic outcomes.

Eleventh, both countries should establish an annual India–Chile Education and Research Dialogue to review scholarship programmes, university partnerships, researcher mobility, joint projects, and emerging academic priorities. A regular institutional mechanism would help ensure that educational cooperation develops continuously rather than remaining dependent on individual university agreements.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with India's Ministry of Education and University Grants Commission, and Chile's Ministry of Education and AGCID. Read alongside Industrial and Manufacturing Cooperation preceding it and Healthcare and Public Health Cooperation that follows.

20. Healthcare and Public Health Cooperation

Overview

This pillar carries distinctive rhetorical weight relative to several others, anchored by Prime Minister Modi's own characterization of India as a reliable partner in Chile's health security, though the specific institutional substance behind that framing is less thoroughly documented than the framing itself.

Current Status

During the April 2025 visit, Modi stated that India has been a reliable partner in ensuring Chile's health security, and the two leaders agreed to deepen this cooperation, a characterization this framework reads as likely referencing India's role as a major global pharmaceutical and vaccine supplier, though the specific programmes underlying it could not be confirmed. This builds on an earlier, more specific initiative: during the 2020 Joint Commission engagement, the two countries discussed a memorandum on generic medicines exports from India to Chile, reported then as in its final stages, whose conclusion this framework could not confirm from more recent sources, a gap already flagged in the Agriculture and Food Security Cooperation pillar.

Priority Actions

First, the two governments should publicly clarify the current status of the 2020 generic medicines memorandum.

Second, Modi's health security characterization should be substantiated with specific, publicly documented pharmaceutical and vaccine trade figures.

Third, given Chilean universities' regionally focused public health programmes, a dedicated public health research partnership, distinct from pharmaceutical trade, should connect Indian and Chilean institutions.

Fourth, healthcare cooperation should extend explicitly to medical devices and diagnostics, an Indian manufacturing strength not currently referenced in bilateral healthcare discussions.

Fifth, given the distance separating the two countries, future healthcare cooperation should prioritize telemedicine and digital health, connecting directly to the digital public infrastructure cooperation described earlier.

Twelfth, India and Chile should establish joint doctoral and postdoctoral research opportunities in strategically important fields such as critical minerals, renewable energy, climate science, space research, biotechnology, and Antarctic studies. Dedicated fellowships would encourage long-term academic collaboration and strengthen specialised research capacity in both countries.

Thirteenth, both governments should develop a student mobility support mechanism providing guidance on visas, accommodation, insurance, academic recognition, and travel arrangements. Given the geographical distance between India and Chile, practical assistance would make international study more accessible and reduce administrative barriers.

Fourteenth, Indian and Chilean institutions should promote joint summer schools and intensive academic programmes, allowing students to spend shorter periods studying subjects relevant to the bilateral relationship. These programmes could combine classroom learning with cultural visits, institutional meetings, and interaction with local communities.

Fifteenth, both countries should strengthen cooperation in vocational and technical education, particularly in areas such as mining technology, renewable energy, advanced manufacturing, agriculture, maritime industries, and digital skills. Institutional exchanges and jointly designed training programmes could align education more closely with emerging employment opportunities.

Sixteenth, India and Chile should encourage greater cooperation between academic libraries, research databases, and scholarly networks, including digital access to publications and research materials. Improved academic connectivity would allow researchers to collaborate more easily despite the physical distance separating the two countries.

Seventeenth, both governments should create an India–Chile Young Researchers Network, connecting early-career academics across disciplines through conferences, mentorship programmes, collaborative research, and online seminars. This would help develop long-term professional relationships and create a new generation of scholars familiar with both countries and their bilateral partnership.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with India's Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and Chile's Ministry of Health. Read alongside Academic and Educational Cooperation preceding it and Youth Cooperation addressed later.

21. Youth Cooperation

Overview

Youth cooperation exists more as an implicit byproduct of other pillars than as a standalone bilateral track, and this framework treats it accordingly, noting where genuine youth-specific programming exists and where it is currently inferred from adjacent activity rather than documented directly.

Current Status

No dedicated India-Chile youth exchange memorandum could be confirmed, despite India's Department of Youth Affairs maintaining an International Cooperation Sub-Scheme built for exactly this purpose with other partner countries. The clearest available connection is indirect: both leaders in April 2025 expressed interest in advancing startup and digital transformation cooperation, sectors disproportionately populated by young professionals, but this was not framed by either side as a youth policy initiative. Indian students in Chile have organized informally around Embassy programming, including International Day of Yoga celebrations, suggesting a self-organizing diaspora youth community exists on the ground even without a formal exchange structure connecting it to Indian domestic youth institutions.

Priority Actions

First, India's Department of Youth Affairs should be tasked with determining whether a Chile-specific youth exchange MoU is under active consideration, formalizing an institutional pathway under its International Youth Exchange Programme.

Second, the startup and digital transformation understanding referenced in the April 2025 joint statement should be explicitly linked to youth entrepreneurship by establishing a bilateral India-Chile Youth Startup Immersion track.

Third, the self-organized Indian student community in Chile should be formally surveyed and engaged by the Indian Mission to map their distribution, institutional affiliations, and capacity to act as bilateral cultural and academic ambassadors.

Fourth, the Chilean National Youth Institute (INJUV) and India's Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports should establish a direct bilateral working group to align strategic priorities in youth civic engagement, digital skilling, and leadership development.

Fifth, a targeted bilateral internship and fellowship mechanism should be launched, enabling young Indian professionals in software, renewable energy, and mining technology to gain operational exposure in Chilean firms, and vice versa.

Sixth, premier higher education institutions across both countries should be incentivized to develop joint student hackathons and innovation challenges centered on shared bilateral concerns, such as water conservation, climate resilience, and sustainable agriculture.

Seventh, reciprocal cultural and youth delegation visits of 20 to 25 delegates should be instituted annually to foster grassroots mutual understanding outside formal diplomatic circles.

Eighth, bilateral sports and physical wellness exchanges targeting youth athletes and university teams should be formalized, utilizing traditional Indian practices like Yoga alongside Chilean outdoor sports disciplines.

Ninth, an India-Chile Digital Youth Forum should be established as an annual track-II platform for emerging leaders from both nations to deliberate on policy, trade, and multilateral cooperation.

Tenth, a dedicated, low-bureaucracy seed fund or prize track should be instituted to support student-led collaborative social ventures and cross-border innovation projects between Indian and Chilean universities.

Eleventh, institutional mechanisms should be created to link India's National Youth Volunteers (NYVs) and Chilean youth volunteer initiatives under INJUV for joint knowledge-sharing on disaster risk reduction and community resilience.

Twelfth, a reciprocal language and cultural exchange scheme should be developed, providing subsidized virtual and in-person Spanish and Hindi language courses for university students in both countries.

Thirteenth, a bilateral "Young Researchers in Mining and Clean Energy" track should be established to sponsor master's and PhD-level exchanges in sustainable lithium extraction, solar technology, and green hydrogen. Fourteenth, a streamlined youth mobility and working holiday visa framework should be negotiated to lower administrative barriers for young professionals and interns seeking short-term placements.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with India's Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports and the Chilean youth policy authority, whose specific counterpart identity could not be confirmed. Read alongside Healthcare and Public Health Cooperation preceding it and Women Empowerment and Gender Equality Cooperation following.

22. Women Empowerment and Gender Equality Cooperation

Overview

This pillar illustrates a pattern that recurs across several of the less institutionalized areas of the India-Chile relationship: a strong initial political signal, in this case the deliberate inclusion of a gender-focused minister in a State Visit delegation, that has not yet been converted into a standing bilateral mechanism. This framework treats that gap as the central analytical fact of the pillar rather than smoothing over it, since an accurate accounting of where political intent has and has not translated into institutional follow-through is more useful to future policymakers than an inflated description of existing cooperation.

Current Status

Chile's Minister of Women and Gender Equality was included in the delegation that accompanied President Boric during the April 2025 State Visit, alongside ministers responsible for foreign affairs, agriculture, mining, and culture, arts and heritage. This is a meaningful data point in itself: many bilateral state visits of comparable scale do not include gender-portfolio ministerial representation at all, and its presence here suggests that gender policy was regarded by the Chilean side as substantive enough to warrant direct ministerial engagement rather than being folded into general people-to-people or social policy discussions led by other portfolios. This framework was, however, unable to confirm what specific outcomes, meetings, or agreements resulted from that minister's participation, and no dedicated gender cooperation memorandum, working group, or joint statement language specific to women's empowerment could be identified from available public records covering the visit.

On the Indian side, the principal visible activity has occurred at the level of cultural and public diplomacy programming rather than policy cooperation. The Embassy of India in Santiago marked International Women's Day on March 7, 2025, with what it described as a portrait exhibition showcasing the contributions of Indian women across science, politics, the arts, and sports. This is consistent with a broader pattern visible across several Embassy-led cultural programmes in Chile, in which themes that could plausibly anchor substantive policy cooperation are instead channeled into commemorative or exhibition-based public diplomacy. This is not a criticism of the programming itself, which serves a legitimate soft-power function, but this framework flags the distinction because commemorative programming and policy cooperation are not interchangeable, and conflating the two risks overstating the pillar's actual institutional depth.

A separate, more organically emerging thread involves professional and scientific exchange led by women on both sides. In 2026, Susana Urrutia, a Chilean surgeon trained additionally in Ayurveda, met with Ambassador Abhilasha Joshi to discuss cooperation in higher education, scientific research, and public health, including Chile's growing interest in Ayurveda as a complementary healthcare practice. This exchange, occurring between a

Chilean woman physician and India's own woman Ambassador to Chile, is illustrative of a kind of women-led professional diplomacy that appears to be happening organically within the broader Healthcare and Academic pillars, but it has not been formally recognized, tracked, or expanded as a gender-cooperation initiative in its own right.

Priority Actions

First, both governments should clarify directly whether any working-level dialogue between India's Ministry of Women and Child Development and Chile's Ministry of Women and Gender Equality followed the April 2025 visit, since this framework's research could not confirm the existence of such a channel despite the ministerial-level presence that would logically precede it.

Second, the MSME cooperation track currently advancing under CEPA negotiations should be required to disaggregate participation and benefit data by gender, given that women-owned enterprises constitute a substantial share of the MSME sector in both economies but the current joint statement language treats MSME cooperation as gender-neutral by default rather than by evidence.

Third, the pattern of ad hoc, individually initiated women-led professional exchange, exemplified by the Urrutia-Joshi meeting, should be converted into a named, funded fellowship or exchange track specifically for women researchers and health professionals, rather than continuing to depend on individual outreach that happens to surface through unrelated channels.

Fourth, a joint baseline assessment should be commissioned to establish what quantifiable gender-relevant indicators, such as women's participation in bilateral trade delegations, scholarship recipients, or scientific exchange programmes, currently exist across the other thirty pillars of this framework, since without such a baseline it will remain difficult to measure whether this pillar's priority actions produce measurable change over time.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with India's Ministry of Women and Child Development and Chile's Ministry of Women and Gender Equality, though this framework notes that responsibility for implementation is currently diffuse, with relevant activity presently occurring instead through the Embassy of India's cultural programming function and through individual professional exchanges that fall outside any single ministry's direct oversight. Coordination with the Ministry of External Affairs and the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs will likely be necessary simply to establish which domestic ministry on each side is prepared to take ownership of this pillar going forward. Read alongside Youth Cooperation preceding it and Labour, Employment and Migration Cooperation following.

23. Labour, Employment and Migration Cooperation

Overview

Among the thirty-one pillars addressed in this framework, labour, employment, and migration cooperation stands out for the clarity of its institutional gap: no formal bilateral instrument, whether a labour mobility agreement, a social security totalization agreement, or a mutual professional qualification recognition framework, could be confirmed as concluded between the two countries as of this framework's preparation. This section therefore focuses substantially on identifying where the underlying commercial and diaspora activity that would normally justify such instruments already exists, so that future negotiators are not starting from a position of having to first establish that a need exists.

Current Status

The clearest evidence of an active, if still informal, labour dimension to the relationship comes from the Indian diaspora already resident in Chile. This community has been described as playing a pivotal role in the bilateral relationship specifically through its participation in business, commerce, information and communications technology, and financial services, functioning in practice as an informal bridge for the exchange of professional expertise between the two economies. This diaspora has also built durable cultural and religious infrastructure, including Hindu temples in Santiago, Iquique, and Punta Arenas, alongside the active presence of organizations such as the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, the Brahma Kumaris, and the Art of Living Foundation, indicating a community of sufficient scale and institutional permanence to plausibly support formal labour mobility cooperation once such instruments exist, even though it currently operates independently of any government-to-government framework.

On the commercial side, the accelerating critical minerals relationship carries direct if currently unquantified labour implications. Coal India Limited's active evaluation of Chilean lithium and copper assets, including its potential acquisition of or joint venture with Kuska Minerals, will, if concluded, generate demand for both Indian technical personnel deployed into Chilean operations and Chilean labour employed within Indian-invested projects. This framework treats this as a probable rather than confirmed outcome, since the underlying transaction itself remained pending regulatory approval as of mid-2026 following Chile's change in government, and no separate labour mobility instrument specific to this or comparable transactions could be identified.

At the official level, a Social Security Agreement was specifically identified as under discussion during the ninth round of Foreign Office Consultations in Santiago in November 2025, intended to prevent double social security contributions for workers posted between the two countries. This is the single most concrete evidence available that both governments recognize the current institutional gap in this pillar and are taking steps to address at least one component of it. Individual migration currently proceeds through standard consular channels.

Indian citizens travelling to Chile for any purpose, including prospective employment, apply through the standard Chilean Consular Attention System or directly through the Chilean Embassy in New Delhi, with no evidence of any streamlined category specific to the bilateral relationship or to the sectors, such as mining engineering, most directly relevant to current bilateral commercial activity.

Priority Actions

First, the Social Security Agreement identified as under discussion at the ninth Foreign Office Consultations round should be tracked to formal conclusion as a matter of priority, since it represents the most advanced labour-related instrument currently in the pipeline and its conclusion would provide a template for subsequent labour agreements.

Second, a mutual recognition framework for technical and engineering qualifications should be developed, anchored specifically in mining engineering, metallurgy, and railway engineering, the three technical domains where bilateral commercial activity is currently most advanced, rather than attempting a broad, sector-agnostic recognition framework from the outset.

Third, both governments should explore a dedicated business and skilled-worker visa facilitation track tied explicitly to the CEPA negotiations, so that the trade and investment liberalization CEPA is designed to deliver is not undercut by continued reliance on standard, non-preferential visa processing for the personnel needed to implement that trade and investment.

Fourth, a joint labour market assessment should be commissioned specifically around the critical minerals sector, quantifying the likely scale of Indian technical postings and Chilean local employment generated by current and pending mining investments, since no such assessment currently exists and its absence makes it difficult to calibrate the scale of labour mobility instruments actually required.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with India's Ministry of Labour and Employment and Chile's Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, with the Social Security Agreement specifically requiring coordination through both Foreign Ministries given its origin within the Foreign Office Consultations process rather than a dedicated labour ministry channel. Read alongside Women Empowerment and Gender Equality Cooperation preceding it and Tourism Cooperation following.

24. Tourism Cooperation

Overview

Tourism cooperation sits at an interesting intersection in this framework: the underlying demand-side conditions, strong destination appeal on both sides and a growing diaspora community, appear favorable, while the supply-side institutional and physical infrastructure, dedicated agreements, preferential visas, and direct connectivity, remains largely absent. This section separates those two dimensions clearly, since conflating destination appeal with institutional readiness would overstate how close this pillar is to producing measurable tourism growth.

Current Status

Chile markets itself internationally around a distinctive combination of assets, including the Patagonian landscapes in the south, the urban and cultural offerings of Santiago, and the Moai statues of Easter Island, and this destination profile is increasingly promoted directly to the Indian outbound leisure travel market by Chilean tourism-facing intermediaries. On the institutional side, however, no dedicated bilateral tourism promotion memorandum, joint marketing initiative, or preferential visa category could be identified. Indian nationals currently travel to Chile for tourism under the country's standard visitor visa category, processed either through the Chilean Consular Attention System or directly through the Chilean Embassy in New Delhi, with standard processing guidance advising against inquiries before fifteen working days have elapsed, a processing framework that does not differ in any identifiable way from Chile's general visitor visa policy applied to non-strategic-partner countries.

The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations currently underway offer the most plausible near-term institutional vehicle for tourism cooperation, given that the CEPA's negotiating scope already extends into services beyond conventional goods trade. However, based on available public reporting of the negotiating rounds concluded through 2025 and 2026, tourism services specifically have not been identified as a named area of active negotiation, with reported sticking points instead concentrated on market access for physical goods including gold, salmon, wine, apples, walnuts, and avocados. This suggests that, even within the CEPA process, tourism has not yet achieved the same negotiating priority as goods trade in critical minerals and agricultural products.

Diaspora-driven travel likely constitutes a meaningful, though currently unquantified, component of existing two-way tourism. The established Indian community networks in Santiago, Iquique, and Punta Arenas, together with their associated cultural and spiritual organizations, generate natural family and community visitation patterns in both directions that function as an informal substitute for, rather than a complement to, more formal government-to-government tourism promotion. Aviation connectivity remains the most significant physical constraint on growth in either direction: no direct flights exist between

India and Chile, requiring all travelers to route through hub airports in North America, Europe, or the Middle East, a structural limitation that is a function of long-haul route economics rather than any diplomatic or institutional shortfall.

Priority Actions

First, feasibility of a dedicated bilateral Tourism Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding should be formally assessed, potentially as a discrete services-chapter component within the ongoing CEPA negotiations, given that no such instrument currently exists and tourism has not yet featured as a named negotiating priority within CEPA despite the agreement's broad services scope.

Second, feasibility studies should be commissioned specifically on codeshare or interline air connectivity arrangements between Indian carriers and Chilean or allied Latin American carriers, since direct route viability is unlikely in the near term given current traffic volumes, but codeshare arrangements could meaningfully reduce door-to-door travel friction without requiring either carrier to commit to an unproven direct route.

Third, both governments should actively and jointly promote diaspora and wellness-tourism circuits, particularly around yoga and Ayurveda, building on Chile's demonstrated grassroots interest reflected in its National Yoga Day designation, since this represents the area of clearest existing demand-side alignment between the two countries.

Fourth, a baseline tourism data-sharing arrangement should be established between the two national tourism authorities, since this framework was unable to identify any published, disaggregated bilateral tourist arrival figures, making it currently impossible to measure whether future cooperation initiatives produce any measurable change in visitor flows.

Fifth, both countries should promote joint digital tourism campaigns, using social media, travel platforms, and multilingual content to highlight cultural, wellness, heritage, and nature-based destinations in India and Chile.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with India's Ministry of Tourism and Chile's National Tourism Service, SERNATUR, with the CEPA negotiating team responsible for any eventual services-chapter provisions relevant to tourism facilitation. Read alongside Labour, Employment and Migration Cooperation preceding it and Sports Cooperation following.

25. Sports Cooperation

Overview

Sports cooperation is treated in this framework as the pillar with the clearest mismatch between domestic institutional capacity, which on the Indian side is substantial, and bilateral programmatic activity, which is effectively absent. This section is accordingly shorter on documented current cooperation and longer on describing the domestic Indian infrastructure that a future agreement could draw upon, since that infrastructure represents the most concrete asset available to build this pillar from its current, largely undeveloped state.

Current Status

No dedicated India-Chile sports cooperation agreement, coaching exchange programme, sports science collaboration, or athlete mobility framework could be identified in currently available public records. This is a genuine gap rather than an artifact of incomplete reporting: unlike several other underdeveloped pillars in this framework, where at least a discussion or an in-principle commitment could be identified within the April 2025 joint statement or subsequent Foreign Office Consultations rounds, sports cooperation was not named as a specific area of discussion in either forum based on available records.

India's domestic sports development infrastructure, by contrast, is extensive. The Khelo India Youth Games, now in a well-established annual cycle, convened its seventh edition across five Bihar cities, Patna, Rajgir, Gaya, Bhagalpur, and Begusarai, from May 4 to May 15, 2025, bringing together more than 10,000 athletes from 28 states and eight union territories across 28 disciplines, with Prime Minister Modi presiding over the opening ceremony. The 2025 edition's inclusion of sepak takraw as a new discipline, prompted by India's gold medal performance at the 2025 ISTAF World Cup, illustrates that the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports actively uses this platform to reflect and reward international competitive achievement, a practice that could plausibly extend to inviting international observer or exhibition delegations, though no evidence indicates this has been extended to Chile specifically or to any other bilateral partner on a comparable basis. The Ministry's budget for fiscal year 2026 to 2027 reached approximately 4,479.88 crore rupees on a gross basis, up from 3,794.30 crore rupees the prior year, reflecting sustained fiscal capacity that is not currently being directed toward any bilateral sports initiative with Chile.

Where sport does surface within the bilateral relationship, it appears only indirectly, through broader cultural representation rather than dedicated athletic programming. The Embassy of India in Santiago's 2025 International Women's Day commemoration, for example, included sport as one of several categories, alongside science, politics, and the arts, in a portrait exhibition of Indian women, indicating that sport is currently treated by Indian diplomatic missions in Chile as a component of general cultural representation rather than as an independent pillar with its own dedicated funding, personnel, or institutional counterpart relationship.

Priority Actions

First, India's Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports should initiate direct outreach to its Chilean counterpart specifically to explore even a basic Sports Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding, since the absence of any prior discussion means this pillar requires genuinely foundational institution-building rather than incremental expansion of an existing but underused agreement.

Second, Chile should be formally invited to send observer or exhibition delegations to future editions of the Khelo India Youth Games, leveraging a platform India has already built, funded, and successfully operated at scale, rather than requiring either government to construct new bilateral sporting infrastructure from first principles.

Third, given the current absence of independent institutional traction, this framework recommends that sports cooperation be administratively folded into the Youth Cooperation working mechanism proposed under the Implementation Framework, rather than continuing to exist as a fully separate track, until such time as it develops sufficient independent activity to warrant a standalone working group.

Fourth, a modest coaching or sports science exchange pilot, potentially in a single discipline where both countries have demonstrated recent international competitiveness, should be explored as a low-cost, low-risk starting point, given that a narrow pilot is more achievable in the near term than a comprehensive sports cooperation framework attempted all at once

Fifth, both countries should encourage youth sports exchanges and joint training camps, providing young athletes and coaches with opportunities to gain international experience while strengthening people-to-people ties between India and Chile.

Sixth, India and Chile should explore cooperation in sports science and athlete development, including training methods, sports medicine, nutrition, and performance analysis, through exchanges between relevant institutes and sporting organisations.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with India's Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports and Chile's Ministry of Sport, though this framework notes that no active working relationship between the two institutions could be confirmed, making the establishment of a basic point of contact itself a necessary first step rather than an assumed starting condition. Read alongside Tourism Cooperation preceding it and Culture and Heritage Cooperation following.

26. Culture and Heritage Cooperation

Overview

Culture and heritage is among the more institutionally developed pillars addressed in this section, distinguished by a signed memorandum of understanding, specific ministerial engagement, and a named area of prospective cooperation, audiovisual co-production, that closely mirrors an existing Indian treaty template with another country. This framework nonetheless flags one significant open item, the unconfirmed status of that audiovisual agreement, as the clearest area requiring follow-up.

Current Status

India and Chile signed a Memorandum of Understanding on cultural exchange on April 1, 2025, during President Boric's State Visit, concluded alongside the disaster management agreement addressed under Pillar 16 of this framework. This was followed the next day by a direct ministerial meeting between India's Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting, Dr. L. Murugan, and Chile's Minister of Culture, Arts and Heritage, Carolina Arredondo, in New Delhi, during which Dr. Murugan formally invited Chile to participate in the World Audio-Visual and Entertainment Summit, WAVES 2025, held in Mumbai from May 1 to 4, 2025, and presented Minister Arredondo with a painting depicting Indian sculptures.

Audiovisual co-production was explicitly named within the April 2025 joint statement as an area both countries agreed to explore, placed alongside health and pharmaceuticals, space, agriculture, and traditional medicine as a named new avenue of cooperation. India has an established template for this specific kind of agreement, having signed a comparable audiovisual co-production treaty with Colombia on October 15, 2024, making Colombia the seventeenth country with which India holds such an arrangement, following earlier treaties with Canada, France, Germany, Brazil, the United Kingdom, Italy, New Zealand, and Poland, among others, a network that collectively produced 29 co-produced projects over the preceding five years. Despite the clear precedent and the explicit naming of this area of interest in the April 2025 joint statement, this framework could not confirm that a comparable India-Chile treaty has since been signed, representing the single clearest unresolved deliverable within this pillar.

Traditional and spiritual culture constitutes the most developed grassroots dimension of this pillar, extending well beyond formal government-to-government programming. Chile's designation of November 4 as National Yoga Day, which Prime Minister Modi described during the April 2025 visit as inspiring, is sustained through Embassy-organized International Day of Yoga celebrations in Santiago that draw participation from both the Indian diaspora and local Chilean residents. This is reinforced by an established base of Hindu temples in Santiago, Iquique, and Punta Arenas and by the active presence of Indian spiritual and cultural organizations, including the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, the

Brahma Kumaris, and the Art of Living Foundation. Language and educational cultural programming has also developed a track record, evidenced by the ICCR-IGNOU Online Hindi Awareness Programme delivered to participants in Chile between August 17 and November 6, 2024, with completion certificates presented by Ambassador Abhilasha Joshi in 2026.

Priority Actions

First, the April 2025 cultural exchange Memorandum of Understanding should be operationalized through a specific, published joint work plan covering museum exchanges, performing arts tours, and reciprocal festival participation, since the existence of a signed agreement does not by itself establish a recurring programmatic calendar.

Second, the audiovisual co-production agreement explicitly named in the April 2025 joint statement should be tracked to confirmed conclusion, modeled directly on the existing India-Colombia treaty structure, given that this represents the clearest gap between stated intent and confirmed outcome within the entire pillar.

Third, the Hindi language and traditional wellness programming already underway through ICCR and Embassy channels should be formalized into a standing, published annual calendar, ensuring continuity of engagement that does not depend on the initiative of any single diplomatic posting.

Fourth, given WAVES 2025 has already occurred, both governments should establish whether a recurring Chilean delegation to future WAVES summits, or a reciprocal Indian delegation to a comparable Chilean cultural or audiovisual industry event, will be formalized as an annual exchange, rather than treating the 2025 invitation as a one-time gesture.

Fifth, India and Chile should establish regular artist, filmmaker, and cultural practitioner exchanges, enabling professionals from both countries to collaborate through workshops, exhibitions, performances, and creative projects that strengthen long-term cultural ties.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with India's Ministry of Culture and Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, and Chile's Ministry of Culture, Arts and Heritage. The Indian Council for Cultural Relations retains parallel responsibility for the language and traditional wellness programming components. Read alongside Sports Cooperation preceding it and Parliamentary and Governance Cooperation following.

27. Parliamentary and Governance Cooperation

Overview

Parliamentary and governance cooperation is best understood in this framework as two related but distinct tracks: a modest, forum-based legislative exchange track, and a more substantial, already well-institutionalized executive governance track built around the Joint Commission Meeting and Foreign Office Consultations mechanisms detailed in the Implementation Framework. This pillar addresses both, while noting that the legislative track in particular remains without any standing institutional home of its own.

Current Status

A delegation from India's Lok Sabha, led by Member of Parliament Shri Jagdambika Pal, travelled to Chile from January 11 to 15, 2025, participating in the Congreso Futuro summit on January 13 and the Third World Summit of the Committees of the Future on January 14, engaging Chilean parliamentarians across a wide range of policy issues. Congreso Futuro is a distinctive institutional feature of Chilean governance, a legislature-convened forum bringing together scientists, policymakers, and global thought leaders to examine long-horizon policy questions, and India's participation signals interest in engaging with this particular Chilean institutional model specifically, rather than confining parliamentary exchange to conventional bilateral legislative visits alone. This framework could not identify any comparable, reciprocal visit by Chilean legislators to the Indian Parliament, nor could it confirm the existence of a standing Inter-Parliamentary Friendship Group dedicated to this relationship in either legislature.

At the executive governance level, cooperation is considerably more developed. The Joint Commission Meeting, established through a Memorandum of Understanding signed in May 2018, convenes at the ministerial level and has met twice to date, first virtually on October 16, 2020, and second in person in New Delhi in August 2024, co-chaired by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Chile's then Foreign Minister Alberto Van Klaveren, with discussions spanning trade and investment, critical minerals, defence, railways, space, and people-to-people ties. The Foreign Office Consultations mechanism, operating at the senior official level, has convened at least nine rounds, most recently in Santiago in November 2025, functioning as the primary vehicle through which implementation of higher-level commitments is tracked between ministerial meetings. A specific governance-adjacent instrument, a Memorandum of Understanding on the gainful employment of spouses and eligible dependents of diplomatic personnel, has also been concluded, a narrow but practically significant agreement supporting the functioning of both countries' diplomatic missions.

Both leaders have also situated governance cooperation within a broader normative frame. During the 53rd Sapru House Lecture delivered in New Delhi on April 2, 2025, President Boric stressed that multilateralism represents the essential path forward for the international

system, a governance-philosophy statement that, while delivered in a multilateral rather than strictly bilateral parliamentary context, nonetheless reflects the kind of shared institutional values underpinning the governance relationship more broadly.

Priority Actions

First, Indian parliamentary participation in Congreso Futuro and the Committees of the Future summit should be formalized into a recurring, calendared commitment scheduled well ahead of each Chilean legislative session, rather than continuing to depend on individual delegation decisions made close to the event itself.

Second, a dedicated Inter-Parliamentary Friendship Group should be established in both the Lok Sabha and the Chilean National Congress if one does not already exist, providing a standing institutional home for legislative exchange independent of any single delegation visit, since this framework's research could not confirm such a body currently exists.

Third, reciprocal visits by Chilean legislators to the Indian Parliament should be actively pursued, given that current legislative exchange appears to flow in only one direction, from India to Chile, based on available records.

Fourth, governance cooperation should be extended explicitly into e-governance and digital administration, building directly on the digital public infrastructure interest already expressed at the leaders' level during the April 2025 visit, since parliamentary and administrative digitization represents a natural complement to the Digital and Cyber Security and Infrastructure and Connectivity pillars addressed elsewhere in this framework.

Fifth, both parliaments should establish a structured annual parliamentary dialogue covering foreign affairs, trade, technology, critical minerals, climate change, and sustainable development, bringing together relevant committees, parliamentary staff, and members from both sides. This would provide a regular platform for exchanging legislative experience, reviewing bilateral priorities, and ensuring that parliamentary cooperation contributes directly to the broader institutional architecture of India–Chile relations.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility for the legislative track rests with the Lok Sabha Secretariat and the Chilean National Congress. Primary responsibility for the executive governance track rests with the Ministry of External Affairs and Chile's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, operating through the Joint Commission Meeting and Foreign Office Consultations mechanisms detailed in the Implementation Framework. Read alongside Culture and Heritage Cooperation preceding it and Legal and Judicial Cooperation following.

28. Legal and Judicial Cooperation

Overview

This framework treats legal and judicial cooperation as the pillar with the widest gap between the scale of commercial activity now occurring between the two countries and the legal infrastructure available to support and protect that activity. The section places particular emphasis on the absence of a bilateral investment protection instrument, given the rapidly growing scale of Indian capital exposure in Chile documented under the Industrial and Manufacturing Cooperation pillar.

Current Status

The two leaders expressed satisfaction in April 2025 at progress toward finalizing an agreement on cooperation and mutual assistance in customs matters, intended to strengthen linkages between enforcement agencies to counter illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and, more broadly, to investigate, prevent, and suppress customs law contraventions while sharing best practices between customs authorities. This framework could not confirm whether this agreement has since been formally signed, though its description in the joint statement as being close to finalization suggests it is among the more advanced items in the broader legal cooperation agenda. A separate agreement on cooperation in the disability sector was also referenced in the joint statement, with officials specifically directed to conclude it at an early date, a commitment framed around contributing to a more humane and just society, though its status likewise could not be confirmed as of this framework's preparation.

At the multilateral level, both countries jointly welcomed the adoption and opening for signature of the Agreement on Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, the BBNJ Agreement, describing it as a key legal framework for marine biodiversity conservation, and reaffirmed a shared resolve to preserve and protect biodiversity from land to sea while committing to support each other in relevant international forums. This represents genuine shared legal engagement, though it is multilateral rather than bilateral in character and does not, by itself, establish any bilateral legal instrument between India and Chile specifically.

No evidence in currently available public records indicates that India and Chile have concluded, or are actively negotiating, a comprehensive Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in criminal matters, an extradition treaty, or a bilateral investment treaty with an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. This is a notable gap given India's broader treaty practice: India signed its first bilateral investment treaty with the United Kingdom in 1994 and had concluded 83 such treaties by 2015, of which 74 were in force at that time, demonstrating that India possesses extensive institutional experience in negotiating this specific category of agreement with other capital-recipient and capital-exporting partners. The absence of a

comparable instrument with Chile stands in contrast to this broader pattern and to the scale of Indian investment now flowing into Chile's mining sector.

Chile's own domestic dispute resolution infrastructure is relevant context for assessing how readily such an instrument could function in practice. The Arbitration and Mediation Centre of the Santiago Chamber of Commerce, known as CAM Santiago, functions as Chile's most prominent institution in this domain and also serves as the local representative of the International Chamber of Commerce, operating within a legal framework that grants a high degree of judicial deference to international arbitration and restricts the grounds on which arbitral awards may be set aside primarily to the annulment motion established under Chile's arbitration statute.

Priority Actions

First, the customs cooperation and mutual assistance agreement described as close to finalization in April 2025 should be tracked to confirmed conclusion, given both leaders' explicit direction to their officials to close out remaining details.

Second, negotiations toward a bilateral investment protection agreement, or at minimum a dedicated investment chapter within the ongoing CEPA negotiations, should be initiated as a priority, incorporating a modern, appropriately calibrated dispute settlement mechanism that reflects both India's extensive BIT negotiating experience and Chile's demonstrably arbitration-friendly domestic legal environment.

Third, the disability sector cooperation agreement referenced in the April 2025 joint statement should be confirmed as either concluded or escalated for finalization, given the explicit direction given to officials and the current absence of confirmation regarding its status.

Fourth, both governments should assess whether a narrower Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in criminal matters, rather than a comprehensive investment or extradition framework, might represent a more achievable near-term deliverable, given that such treaties are typically less politically sensitive to negotiate than investment or extradition instruments and could serve as a confidence-building step toward the more substantial investment protection agreement recommended above.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with India's Ministry of Law and Justice and Ministry of Finance for customs and investment-related matters, and Chile's Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, with the CEPA negotiating team bearing responsibility for any investment chapter pursued through that channel. Read alongside Parliamentary and Governance Cooperation preceding it and Multilateral and Regional Cooperation following.

29. Multilateral and Regional Cooperation

Overview

This pillar is distinguished by an unusual asymmetry relative to most others in this framework: the political alignment between the two countries is exceptionally strong and publicly documented at the highest level, yet this framework was unable to identify any standing bilateral mechanism specifically dedicated to translating that alignment into coordinated procedural action, such as joint statements or working papers, at the multilateral bodies where the alignment is most relevant.

Current Status

President Boric used the 53rd Sapru House Lecture, delivered in New Delhi on April 2, 2025, under the theme Chile and India, Side by Side in the Global South, to state explicitly that Chile has always called for United Nations reforms and to voice support for India's permanent membership in an expanded Security Council, framing India's technological leadership as directly relevant to Chile's own development trajectory. This is among the clearest, most public, and most senior-level expressions of multilateral solidarity documented anywhere in this framework, delivered on Indian soil at India's premier foreign policy institution rather than through a routine diplomatic communiqué.

India has reciprocated this alignment consistently, praising Chile's participation in the Voice of the Global South Summits and specifically highlighting President Boric's own remarks at the third such summit held on August 17, 2023. India's broader multilateral reform agenda, as articulated before the United Nations Security Council, emphasizes strengthening the Voice of the Global South across multilateral forums, reforming the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the World Trade Organization, and pursuing a rules-based international architecture grounded in dialogue, cooperation, mutual respect, and international law, an agenda with which Chile's own stated positions appear closely aligned based on available public statements.

Regionally, Chile's institutional weight within Latin America offers India a significant, though not fully utilized, gateway. Chile hosted the first Community of Latin American and Caribbean States Summit in January 2013, and CELAC itself, a bloc of 33 sovereign countries with a combined land area roughly six times that of India, has hosted ministerial-level dialogue with India's Ministry of External Affairs, including engagement with the CELAC Quartet. Chile's foreign ministry involvement in early India-CELAC ministerial dialogue processes underscores its role as one of the more consistently engaged Latin American partners within this broader framework, though this framework could not identify evidence that India has deliberately or explicitly used the bilateral Chile relationship as a structured entry point for deeper CELAC engagement, as opposed to the two tracks, bilateral and regional, developing somewhat independently of one another.

India's broader Global South coalition-building, including its leadership role in the International Solar Alliance and the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure, both referenced explicitly within the April 2025 joint statement, provides additional issue-specific platforms in which Chile is an active participant, discussed in fuller detail under the Sustainable Development pillar that follows.

Priority Actions

First, a standing consultation mechanism specifically dedicated to coordinating positions ahead of major multilateral negotiations, including United Nations General Assembly sessions, World Trade Organization ministerial conferences, and climate negotiations, should be established, since current alignment, however strong at the rhetorical level, does not appear to rest on any structured, recurring coordination process.

Second, India should deliberately and explicitly use the Chile relationship as a structured entry point for deepening its broader institutional engagement with CELAC, given Chile's founding role in hosting the organization's first summit, rather than allowing the bilateral and regional tracks to continue developing on separate, uncoordinated timelines.

Third, both governments should explore joint advocacy on shared multilateral reform priorities, particularly Security Council expansion and Bretton Woods institution reform, through coordinated statements or joint working papers submitted to relevant United Nations bodies, converting the verbal support already exchanged at the highest political level into a more procedurally visible form of diplomatic collaboration.

Fourth, a joint annual review of multilateral voting and statement alignment should be conducted at the Foreign Office Consultations level, providing both governments with an evidence base for assessing how closely rhetorical alignment on reform priorities translates into practice across specific multilateral votes and negotiations over time.

Sixth, the two parliaments should establish regular exchanges between committee secretariats and legislative research staff, particularly in areas such as economic policy, digital governance, environmental regulation, and foreign affairs. Such professional-level engagement would strengthen institutional knowledge and ensure that parliamentary cooperation continues even between elected members' visits.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with both countries' Ministries of Foreign Affairs, specifically their respective divisions responsible for United Nations and multilateral affairs. Read alongside Legal and Judicial Cooperation preceding it and Sustainable Development Cooperation following.

30. Sustainable Development Cooperation

Overview

Sustainable development cooperation is one of the more institutionally substantive pillars in this section of the framework, anchored in confirmed dual membership across two major Indian-led Global South coalitions. This framework's principal observation is that membership itself, while genuinely significant, has not yet been visibly converted into a Chile-specific, funded programme of activity under either coalition's more granular partnership instruments.

Current Status

Chile formally became the 95th member of the International Solar Alliance on November 7, 2023, when its Ambassador to India presented the country's Instrument of Ratification. The Alliance itself, co-founded by India and France in 2015 at the Paris Climate Change Conference, has since grown to more than 120 member and signatory countries and has pursued an expanding agenda including the Small Island Developing States Platform, the One Sun One World One Grid Programme for cross-border clean electricity transmission, and a Country Partnership Framework instrument designed to align Alliance programming with individual member countries' national priorities, policies, and climate ambitions. The Alliance elected India as President and France as Co-President for the 2024 to 2026 term at its seventh Assembly session, and marked its tenth Foundation Day on March 11, 2026, pursuing global targets of 1,000 gigawatts of deployed solar capacity and more than one trillion United States dollars in mobilized solar investment by 2030. Despite Chile's membership since 2023, this framework could not confirm that a Country Partnership Framework specific to Chile has been activated, meaning the tangible, funded programming available under this specific Alliance instrument does not yet appear to have been extended to the bilateral relationship in a documented form.

Separately, Chile joined the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure in January 2021, an initiative aimed at making national infrastructure systems resilient in support of the Sustainable Development Goals, a membership Prime Minister Modi specifically acknowledged alongside the International Solar Alliance membership in the April 2025 joint statement. This dual coalition membership distinguishes Chile from several of India's other Latin American partners and reflects a level of institutional alignment on sustainable development architecture that, at least at the membership level, exceeds what has been documented in several other pillars of this framework. As with the Solar Alliance, however, this framework could not identify evidence of a specific, named joint programme or working group connecting Chile's Coalition membership to any concrete bilateral infrastructure resilience project.

Sustainable development cooperation also intersects directly with the critical minerals relationship addressed under the Industrial and Manufacturing Cooperation pillar, since

India's entire strategic rationale for deepening its lithium and copper engagement with Chile is rooted in enabling India's own clean energy and electric vehicle transition. This means mineral supply chain security functions, in practical terms, as an upstream input into both countries' sustainable development objectives, even though the mineral trade relationship and the formal sustainable development coalition memberships currently appear to be advancing along largely separate institutional tracks rather than being explicitly linked.

Priority Actions

First, a Country Partnership Framework specific to Chile should be formally activated under the International Solar Alliance, translating Chile's membership since November 2023 into concrete, funded programming tailored to its exceptional Atacama Desert solar resource base, since this instrument exists within the Alliance's own architecture but does not appear to have been used in the Chile relationship to date.

Second, a joint working group should be established under the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure framework specifically connecting Chile's 2021 membership to concrete bilateral activity, and this working group should be explicitly linked to the Disaster Management and Humanitarian Cooperation pillar addressed earlier in this framework, given the substantial thematic overlap between infrastructure resilience and broader sustainable development objectives.

Third, sustainable and responsible mining standards should be incorporated explicitly into the critical minerals cooperation agenda advancing under the CEPA negotiations, ensuring the rapidly expanding mineral trade relationship develops in a manner consistent with both countries' stated sustainable development commitments rather than treating environmental standards as a separate, subsequent consideration addressed only after commercial terms are settled.

Fourth, both governments should jointly publish an annual accounting of Chile's specific, quantified contribution toward the International Solar Alliance's 2030 targets, since no source identified in this framework's research disaggregates Chile's individual contribution from the Alliance's broader global totals, making it currently impossible to assess whether Chile's membership is translating into measurable progress.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with India's Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, in its capacity administering the International Solar Alliance, and Chile's Ministry of Energy, with the Ministry of Home Affairs and Chile's disaster management authority bearing joint responsibility for the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure track. Read alongside Multilateral and Regional Cooperation preceding it and Innovation and Entrepreneurship Cooperation following.

31. Innovation and Entrepreneurship Cooperation

Overview

This closing pillar carries the clearest, most specifically named open commitment of any pillar addressed in this framework: both leaders explicitly agreed in April 2025 to advance a specific digital transformation cooperation understanding, yet this framework's research could not confirm that this instrument has since been signed. This makes innovation and entrepreneurship cooperation an unusually concrete test case for how efficiently the broader Implementation Framework proposed in this document can convert a clearly stated bilateral commitment into a concluded agreement.

Current Status

During the April 2025 State Visit, both leaders expressed their desire for advancing the signing of an understanding on cooperation in the area of digital transformation, intended specifically to facilitate deeper engagement between the technology sectors of India and Chile. This was reinforced by the Embassy of India in Santiago's subsequent bilateral brief, which explicitly listed startups and audiovisual co-production among the new avenues of cooperation opened by the visit, alongside trade, mining, health and pharmaceuticals, agriculture, and green energy, indicating that startup and innovation cooperation was treated by the Embassy as a standalone strategic priority rather than a peripheral element of the broader trade agenda.

India's domestic innovation ecosystem provides substantial institutional depth that could underpin this cooperation. The Startup India Initiative marked a full decade of operation on National Startup Day, January 16, 2026, with Prime Minister Modi highlighting the ecosystem's transformation from a 2016 policy initiative into one of the largest and most diverse startup ecosystems in the world, explicitly aligned with India's broader Viksit Bharat 2047 vision. As of December 2025, India's startup ecosystem comprised more than 200,000 recognized startups, with the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology's Startup Hub alone backing over 6,148 startups, more than 517 incubators, and over 329 specialized laboratories, coordinated through the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade. Notably, more than 45 percent of recognized Indian startups had at least one woman director or partner as of December 2025, a data point that connects this pillar directly to the Women Empowerment and Gender Equality pillar addressed earlier in this framework, though no evidence indicates this connection has been made explicit in any bilateral programming to date.

India's approach to institutionalizing startup cooperation internationally relies increasingly on structured memoranda of understanding, evidenced domestically by a series of 2026 agreements between the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade and organizations including Cashfree Payments, Darwin Dynamics, Vultr India, Cars24, and the Council for Startup India, spanning fintech, cloud infrastructure, deep-tech innovation, and

global market access. Internationally, a comparable memorandum of understanding was signed with the Startup Policy Forum in January 2025, explicitly aimed at promoting the Indian startup ecosystem globally, and India further showcased its innovation ecosystem through Bharat Innovates 2026, a compendium and exhibition of 120 deep-technology ventures spanning health-tech, sustainability, agriculture, education, and mobility.

Priority Actions

First, the digital transformation cooperation understanding referenced explicitly in the April 2025 joint statement should be tracked to confirmed signature as an urgent priority, given that both leaders publicly committed to this specific instrument well over a year before this framework's preparation and its continued unconfirmed status represents the clearest gap between stated political intent and documented outcome anywhere in this framework.

Second, a dedicated India-Chile Startup Bridge programme should be established, connecting Chilean early-stage ventures with India's incubator and accelerator network, including the MeitY Startup Hub, following the multi-stakeholder memorandum of understanding model India has already applied successfully both domestically and with the Startup Policy Forum internationally.

Third, given the direct relevance of India's deep-technology ecosystem to sectors already central to the bilateral relationship, particularly mining technology, clean energy, and agri-tech, both governments should explore a sector-specific innovation partnership focused on mining and critical minerals technology, explicitly linking this pillar to the Industrial and Manufacturing Cooperation and Science, Technology and Innovation pillars addressed elsewhere in this framework, so that startup cooperation reinforces rather than duplicates the broader economic partnership already underway.

Fourth, given that more than 45 percent of India's recognized startups include a woman director or partner, a specific gender-inclusion benchmark should be built into any future Startup Bridge programme from its inception, ensuring the pillar's design reflects the demonstrated composition of the ecosystem it draws upon rather than defaulting to a gender-neutral programme structure.

Institutional Responsibility

Primary responsibility rests with India's Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade and Chile's Production Development Corporation, CORFO, with the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology's Startup Hub serving as the likely operational partner for any Startup Bridge programme established under this pillar. Read alongside Sustainable Development Cooperation preceding it, closing the 31 Pillars of Cooperation.

IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK

Institutional Mechanisms

The institutional core of the India-Chile bilateral relationship is built around two principal standing mechanisms, both of which predate this Cooperative Framework and should be retained and strengthened as its primary implementing vehicles. The first is the India-Chile Joint Commission, established through a Memorandum of Understanding signed during a visit by India's Minister of State for External Affairs to Chile in May 2018 (Embassy of India, Santiago, 2026c). The Joint Commission convenes at the ministerial level, co-chaired by India's External Affairs Minister and Chile's Minister of Foreign Affairs, and represents the highest standing institutional forum through which the two governments conduct comprehensive periodic review of the bilateral relationship outside of head-of-state visits. The first Joint Commission Meeting was held virtually on October 16, 2020, a format necessitated by pandemic-era travel constraints, while the second Joint Commission Meeting convened in person in New Delhi in August 2024, co-chaired by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Chile's then Minister of Foreign Affairs Alberto Van Klaveren (Embassy of India, Santiago, 2026c; Deccan Herald, 2024). During the second Joint Commission Meeting, the two ministers engaged in what was described as a productive and wide-ranging discussion spanning trade and investment, critical minerals, defence, railways, space, and people-to-people ties, with Minister Jaishankar specifically underscoring the value India places on Chile's participation in the Voice of the Global South Summit (Deccan Herald, 2024).

The second principal mechanism is the Foreign Office Consultations process, conducted at the senior official level and co-chaired on the Indian side by the Secretary (East) in the Ministry of External Affairs and on the Chilean side by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This mechanism has proven to be the most consistently active of the two, having convened at least nine rounds to date, with the eighth round held in New Delhi in March 2023 and the ninth round convening in Santiago in November 2025, explicitly structured as a follow-up mechanism to track implementation of the commitments made during President Boric's State Visit to India earlier that year (Embassy of India, Santiago, 2026c; Greater Kashmir, 2025). During the ninth round, the two sides undertook a comprehensive review of the entire spectrum of bilateral relations and specifically reviewed progress on matters discussed between Prime Minister Modi and President Boric in April 2025, including the pace of the ongoing Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations, reaffirming their commitment to an early conclusion of that agreement (Greater Kashmir, 2025). Notably, the ninth round also addressed a concrete visa facilitation measure, discussing the launch of a multiple-entry visa category for Indian business persons and professionals, an initiative President Boric had announced during his April 2025 visit, illustrating how the Foreign Office Consultations mechanism functions not merely as a review forum but as an active vehicle for closing out specific, previously announced commitments (News on Air, 2025c).

A third, increasingly significant institutional layer has emerged specifically around the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations, operating in parallel to the broader diplomatic mechanisms described above. This track is driven by direct engagement between India's Commerce Secretary and Chile's Vice-Minister of International Economic Relations at the Under-Secretariat for International Economic Relations, known by its Spanish acronym SUBREI, currently led by Vice Minister Paula Estévez (Institute for Management and Public Interest Research India, 2026). High-level political momentum for this track was reinforced during the May 2026 visit of Chile's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Francisco Pérez Mackenna, to New Delhi, where he held bilateral talks with India's Union Minister of Commerce and Industry, Piyush Goyal, and where parallel official-level engagements between the two Commerce Secretariats established joint oversight frameworks specifically targeting non-tariff measures and sanitary and phytosanitary barriers that have traditionally slowed agricultural and pharmaceutical trade between South Asia and South America (Institute for Management and Public Interest Research India, 2026). The CEPA negotiating architecture is thus already operating as a dedicated ministerial and official-level joint committee structure in its own right, designed to continuously monitor trade flows, resolve non-tariff barriers, and streamline regulatory cooperation on an ongoing basis rather than solely at periodic negotiating rounds (Institute for Management and Public Interest Research India, 2026).

For the purposes of this Cooperative Framework, these three existing mechanisms, the Joint Commission Meeting, the Foreign Office Consultations, and the CEPA negotiating architecture, should be formally recognized as the three central pillars of the overall Institutional Mechanism structure, with the 31 sectoral pillars distributed across them according to their primary character. Political and Diplomatic Cooperation, Multilateral and Regional Cooperation, and Parliamentary and Governance Cooperation should report primarily through the Joint Commission Meeting and Foreign Office Consultations track. Economic and Trade, Financial, Investment, Industrial and Manufacturing, and Labour cooperation should report primarily through the CEPA negotiating architecture. The remaining, more technically specialized pillars, spanning energy, defence, science and technology, health, education, environment, and the social and cultural pillars, require dedicated Joint Working Groups, discussed in detail below, that report upward into the Foreign Office Consultations mechanism at each biennial or triennial round.

To close identified institutional gaps, this Framework recommends the establishment of one additional standing mechanism: a Ministerial-Level Council on Critical Minerals and Industrial Cooperation, co-chaired by India's Minister of Mines and Chile's Minister of Mining, given the scale and strategic centrality that the critical minerals relationship has assumed within the overall bilateral partnership, as documented extensively under Pillars 5, 6, and 18 of this Framework. Given that critical minerals cooperation currently advances primarily through commercial actors such as Coal India Limited and through the broader CEPA architecture, a dedicated ministerial council specific to mining and minerals would provide the sector with an institutional profile commensurate with its economic weight in the

relationship, comparable to the sector-specific ministerial mechanisms India has established with other strategic mineral-supplying partners.

Joint Working Groups

Joint Working Groups constitute the operational backbone through which the technical substance of each pillar advances between the periodic meetings of the Joint Commission and the Foreign Office Consultations. India has already demonstrated, both domestically and through comparable bilateral relationships, a well-established institutional model for how such groups should function, evidenced by structures such as the longstanding India-Indonesia Joint Working Group on Counter Terrorism, which has convened regularly since its first meeting in February 2005 pursuant to a 2004 memorandum of understanding, with its most recent, sixth meeting held in Jakarta in August 2024 (Indian Defence News, 2026). This pattern, a working group established under a specific foundational memorandum of understanding, meeting on a predictable and recurring cadence, and reporting progress upward into the broader bilateral consultation architecture, should be replicated systematically across the India-Chile relationship.

At present, the India-Chile relationship possesses the building blocks for such working groups but has not yet formalized many of them into standing, named institutions with defined meeting cadences. The ninth round of Foreign Office Consultations in November 2025 identified a substantial list of agreements still under negotiation or awaiting finalization, including cooperation in customs matters, recognition of the Indian Pharmacopoeia, cooperation in Traditional Medicine and Yoga, a Social Security Agreement, cooperation in the space sector, and training and capacity building in security, education, science and technology, and cultural and visa matters (News on Air, 2025c). Each of these represents a natural candidate for conversion into a dedicated Joint Working Group once the underlying agreement is concluded, ensuring that implementation continues on a structured basis after the signing ceremony rather than losing momentum once the initial political announcement has passed.

This Framework recommends the establishment of the following Joint Working Groups, organized to align directly with the 31 Pillars of Cooperation articulated earlier in this document. A Joint Working Group on Critical Minerals and Mining should be constituted under the proposed Ministerial-Level Council on Critical Minerals and Industrial Cooperation, tasked with overseeing exploration and processing partnerships, including active transactions such as Coal India Limited's evaluation of Chilean lithium assets, and with negotiating the long-term supply agreements India has specifically requested from Chile. A Joint Working Group on Health, Pharmaceuticals, and Traditional Medicine should be established to finalize and then implement the Indian Pharmacopoeia recognition agreement and the Traditional Medicine and Yoga cooperation instrument, building directly on the substantial groundwork already documented under Pillar 20 of this Framework. A Joint Working Group on Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilient Infrastructure should operationalize

the April 2025 disaster management memorandum and coordinate Chile's continuing participation in the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure, linking Pillars 16 and 30 of this Framework. A Joint Working Group on Digital Transformation and Innovation should be tasked specifically with finalizing the digital transformation cooperation understanding referenced in the April 2025 joint statement and with operationalizing the proposed India-Chile Startup Bridge programme discussed under Pillar 31.

Beyond these priority groups, this Framework recommends establishing a Joint Working Group on Education and Youth Exchange, consolidating the currently separate but thematically overlapping Academic and Educational Cooperation and Youth Cooperation pillars, given the substantial institutional overlap between ICCR scholarship administration, the EdCIL partnership arrangements already agreed with the Council of Rectors of Chilean Universities, and prospective youth exchange programming under India's Rashtriya Yuva Sashaktikaran Karyakram framework. A further Joint Working Group on Culture, Sports, and People-to-People Exchange should consolidate the Culture and Heritage, Sports, and Tourism pillars, reflecting both the practical overlap in stakeholder communities, particularly the Indian diaspora in Chile, and the efficiency of coordinating soft-power and cultural diplomacy programming through a single administrative channel rather than three separate ones.

Each Joint Working Group established under this Framework should adhere to a minimum standard of institutional discipline: a defined co-chairing arrangement at the joint secretary or director-general equivalent level on each side, a meeting cadence of no less than once every eighteen months, a standing secretariat function housed within the respective Foreign Ministries to maintain continuity of documentation between meetings, and a mandate to produce a brief, written record of decisions and action items after each meeting that feeds directly into the next Foreign Office Consultations round. This documentation requirement is essential given the demonstrated pattern, visible across the pillars addressed earlier in this Framework, in which political commitments made during high-profile visits, such as the April 2025 State Visit, have in several cases taken well over a year to progress from announcement to formal conclusion, a gap that more disciplined working group documentation and follow-through could meaningfully narrow.

Monitoring and Evaluation Framework

A credible Monitoring and Evaluation Framework is necessary to ensure that the ambitious scope of this Cooperative Framework, spanning 31 distinct pillars of cooperation, does not result in a diffusion of attention across too many simultaneously active tracks, with genuine progress concentrated in only a handful of high-visibility areas while others remain permanently aspirational. The evidence assembled across this Framework's pillar-by-pillar analysis already illustrates this risk in embryonic form: critical minerals cooperation, healthcare, and disaster management have each generated concrete, dated institutional milestones, while pillars such as sports cooperation and labour mobility remain, as of the preparation of this Framework, substantively undeveloped despite having been named in the broader architecture of bilateral engagement. A structured monitoring mechanism is required

to ensure that underdeveloped pillars receive deliberate institutional attention rather than being permanently deprioritized by default.

This Framework proposes a three-tiered monitoring architecture, calibrated to the existing rhythm of India-Chile institutional engagement rather than requiring the creation of an entirely new reporting bureaucracy. At the first tier, each Joint Working Group established under this Framework should maintain a simple, standardized scorecard tracking the status of every named agreement, initiative, or commitment falling within its mandate, categorized as either concluded and under implementation, under active negotiation, or identified but not yet formally initiated. This scorecard should be updated at each working group meeting and should explicitly track elapsed time since a commitment was first announced at the political level, given that the interval between political announcement and formal conclusion has, in several documented instances within this Framework, extended well beyond a year.

At the second tier, the Foreign Office Consultations mechanism, already meeting on a roughly annual to biennial basis, should serve as the principal aggregation point at which the scorecards from all active Joint Working Groups are consolidated into a single comprehensive status report. This is consistent with the function the Foreign Office Consultations mechanism has already demonstrably performed, evidenced by the ninth round's explicit review of progress on matters discussed during the April 2025 State Visit and its detailed enumeration of agreements still pending finalization (News on Air, 2025c). This Framework recommends only that this existing practice be formalized into a standard, written template applied consistently across consultation rounds, rather than relying on ad hoc communiqué language that can vary in specificity from one round to the next.

At the third tier, the Joint Commission Meeting, convening at the ministerial level on a less frequent basis, roughly every two to four years based on the historical pattern of meetings in October 2020 and August 2024, should serve as the highest-level accountability checkpoint, at which the two Foreign Ministers formally review the consolidated status across all 31 pillars and provide political direction on which underperforming pillars require elevated attention or, where circumstances warrant, recalibrated ambition (Embassy of India, Santiago, 2026c; Deccan Herald, 2024). Given the roughly four-year gap that in practice separated the first and second Joint Commission Meetings, this Framework recommends that both governments commit to a more predictable triennial cadence going forward, reducing the risk that institutional monitoring lapses during periods without a scheduled ministerial meeting.

Quantitative indicators should supplement this qualitative institutional review wherever data availability permits. For pillars with clear, trackable metrics, trade and investment cooperation can be monitored against bilateral trade volume, which reached approximately 2.6 billion United States dollars in Indian imports from Chile alone in fiscal year 2025, providing a clear year-on-year baseline against which future growth, or contraction, can be measured (India Briefing, 2025). Critical minerals cooperation can be tracked against the specific volume and value of Indian investment commitments in Chilean mining assets, education cooperation against the number of ICCR scholarships and EdCIL partnership placements utilized by Chilean nationals, and disaster management cooperation against the

frequency and substance of joint training exercises conducted under the April 2025 memorandum. Where such quantitative indicators do not yet exist, as is currently the case for several of the less developed pillars addressed in this Framework, including sports and labour mobility cooperation, the establishment of a baseline indicator should itself be treated as a first-year deliverable for the relevant Joint Working Group.

Periodic Review Mechanism

The Periodic Review Mechanism formalizes the cadence at which the overall Cooperative Framework, as distinct from any individual pillar or working group, is assessed for continued relevance, comprehensiveness, and ambition. Bilateral frameworks of this scope carry an inherent risk of institutional staleness: pillars framed in response to the priorities and global conditions prevailing at the time of drafting may, over a period of years, cease to reflect the most consequential dimensions of the relationship, while genuinely emergent areas of cooperation may develop without a clear pillar home. The rapid emergence of critical minerals cooperation as arguably the single most dynamic dimension of the India-Chile relationship between 2024 and 2026, a development that would not have been fully anticipated in a framework drafted even five years earlier, illustrates precisely this kind of structural shift that a periodic review process must be equipped to accommodate.

This Framework recommends that a full review of the Cooperative Framework's structure, encompassing a possible revision of the pillar list itself, be conducted no less frequently than once every five years, timed where possible to coincide with a Joint Commission Meeting so that any structural revisions carry the necessary ministerial-level endorsement. This quinquennial review should assess three specific questions for each existing pillar: whether the pillar continues to reflect an active and substantive area of bilateral engagement, whether its current institutional home, whether a dedicated Joint Working Group or a broader consolidated group, remains the appropriate administrative structure, and whether emerging developments, such as new technologies, new multilateral commitments, or new commercial developments of the kind driving the critical minerals relationship, warrant either the creation of new pillars or the consolidation of existing ones.

Independent of this five-year structural review, an annual administrative review should be conducted at the working level, most naturally embedded within the existing Foreign Office Consultations cycle, focused narrowly on verifying that the Monitoring and Evaluation Framework's scorecards are current, that all designated Joint Working Groups have met within the preceding eighteen months as specified under the Institutional Mechanisms section above, and that any working groups that have failed to convene within that window are flagged for corrective action at the next available ministerial-level opportunity. This annual administrative check functions as a lighter-touch complement to the substantive five-year structural review, ensuring that basic institutional discipline is maintained continuously rather than only being assessed periodically.

The Periodic Review Mechanism should also incorporate a formal channel through which each government's private sector, academic institutions, and civil society organizations

engaged in bilateral cooperation, including entities such as the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Chile's Federation of Industry, which have already signed a memorandum of understanding specifically to support the CEPA negotiations, can submit input ahead of the quinquennial structural review (India Briefing, 2025). This ensures that the Periodic Review Mechanism draws on operational experience from the commercial and institutional actors actually implementing cooperation on the ground, rather than relying solely on the perspectives of the diplomatic officials responsible for the Framework's administration, who may not always have direct visibility into implementation challenges arising at the level of individual firms, universities, or civil society organizations.

Taken together, the Institutional Mechanisms, Joint Working Groups, Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, and Periodic Review Mechanism described in this chapter are designed to function as a coherent, mutually reinforcing system rather than as four independent administrative requirements. The Institutional Mechanisms establish who is responsible for each pillar. The Joint Working Groups establish how that responsibility is discharged on a recurring, documented basis. The Monitoring and Evaluation Framework establishes how progress, or the absence of it, is tracked and surfaced to political leadership. The Periodic Review Mechanism establishes when the entire structure itself is reassessed for continued fitness to purpose. This layered design is intended to give the India-Chile Cooperative Framework the institutional resilience to sustain momentum across pillars of widely varying maturity, from the rapidly advancing critical minerals relationship to comparatively nascent pillars such as sports and labour mobility cooperation, without allowing the less developed tracks to be permanently neglected in favor of those that generate more immediate political visibility.

ROADMAP FOR FUTURE COOPERATION

Strategic Vision 2050

The Strategic Vision 2050 articulated in this Cooperative Framework is grounded in the observation that the India-Chile relationship, notwithstanding seven decades of formal diplomatic ties, has only in the period between 2024 and 2026 acquired the institutional depth and commercial substance to support a genuinely comprehensive, thirty-one-pillar partnership of the kind this Framework proposes. The vision therefore begins from a position of realistic ambition: the relationship is not being redirected from an existing mature strategic partnership but is instead being deliberately constructed, largely from the ground up, across most of the pillars addressed in this Framework, with critical minerals, healthcare, and disaster management already serving as proof points that rapid, substantive deepening is achievable when clear commercial or humanitarian logic aligns with sustained political attention.

By 2050, this Framework envisions India and Chile as anchor partners for each other within their respective regions, India as Chile's principal gateway to South Asian markets, technology, and Global South diplomatic coordination, and Chile as India's principal gateway to the mineral wealth, Pacific coast logistics, and broader Latin American regional architecture of the Southern Cone. This vision is not merely aspirational rhetoric but follows directly from the structural complementarity already driving the relationship's fastest-growing pillar: India's National Critical Mineral Mission, launched by the Ministry of Mines in January 2025, explicitly identifies diversified international mineral partnerships as central to India's clean energy and advanced manufacturing security, while Chile's economy remains structurally dependent on translating its exceptional copper and lithium reserves into durable, long-term export relationships and, increasingly, higher value-added domestic processing partnerships (Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2026). This complementarity is durable rather than cyclical, since it rests on the underlying geology and industrial strategy of both countries rather than on any particular short-term price cycle in global commodity markets.

The Strategic Vision 2050 is also explicitly nested within India's own long-horizon national development framework, *Viksit Bharat 2047*, the vision of a developed India timed to coincide with the centenary of Indian independence. Indian Railways' record capital expenditure allocations, the National Startup Day emphasis on aligning entrepreneurship policy with the *Viksit Bharat 2047* trajectory, and the broader National Critical Mineral Mission are each explicitly framed by Indian policymakers as building blocks toward this 2047 milestone (India Brand Equity Foundation, 2025; *Drishti IAS*, 2026; Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2026). This Framework proposes that the India-Chile relationship be understood, and periodically evaluated, as a specific, named component of that broader *Viksit Bharat* trajectory, particularly with respect to the mineral security, clean energy, and advanced manufacturing dimensions in which Chile plays an outsized role relative to its population and economic size. Extending the horizon three years

further, to 2050, allows this Framework to look beyond the Viksit Bharat 2047 milestone itself toward the kind of mature, diversified, thirty-one-pillar partnership that a further three years of consolidation could plausibly deliver.

For Chile, this Strategic Vision 2050 aligns with the country's own stated ambition, articulated at the ministerial level during the April 2025 State Visit, of positioning itself as a trusted partner for sustainable technology and innovation, leveraging its international reputation for institutional stability and its status as a member of the OECD to attract higher-quality, longer-horizon investment than a purely extractive relationship would generate (The Indian Awaaz, 2025). The India-Chile relationship envisioned by 2050 under this Framework is therefore explicitly not a simple raw-material-for-manufactured-goods exchange of the kind that has historically characterized parts of India's engagement with resource-rich partners, but rather a genuinely diversified partnership in which mineral value chains sit alongside mature cooperation in pharmaceuticals, digital public infrastructure, disaster resilience, space and Antarctic science, education, and cultural exchange, each pillar reinforcing the overall strategic weight and durability of the relationship rather than leaving it dependent on the continued strength of any single commodity market.

The Strategic Vision 2050 rests on four pillars of durability that this Framework identifies as the necessary conditions for the relationship to mature as envisioned. First, institutional resilience, achieved through the Implementation Framework detailed earlier in this document, ensuring that cooperation continues to advance across changes in political leadership on both sides, including the transition already navigated with the March 2026 inauguration of President Kast in Chile. Second, economic diversification, ensuring that the relationship's center of gravity gradually broadens beyond critical minerals to encompass a genuinely balanced portfolio across the pillars addressed in this Framework, reducing vulnerability to commodity price cycles or shifts in any single sector's strategic salience. Third, people-to-people depth, built through sustained investment in the Academic and Educational, Youth, and Culture and Heritage pillars, ensuring that the relationship by 2050 rests on a broad base of individual and institutional relationships rather than solely on government-to-government agreements. Fourth, multilateral alignment, building on the already substantial convergence between the two countries on Global South representation, United Nations reform, and coalitions such as the International Solar Alliance and the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure, ensuring that the bilateral relationship continues to reinforce, and be reinforced by, both countries' broader international positioning.

Short-Term Priorities (1 to 5 Years)

The short-term horizon of this Framework, spanning approximately 2026 to 2031, is dominated by a single, time-bound priority around which most other near-term deliverables should be sequenced: the conclusion and initial implementation of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement. Negotiations, launched following the signing of Terms of Reference on May 8, 2025, and formally opened in New Delhi on May 26, 2025, have progressed through four negotiating rounds as of December 2025, with both governments reiterating a strong commitment to timely conclusion at each successive round (DD News,

2025; News on Air, 2025g). By January 2026, Chile's Ambassador to India, Juan Angulo, expressed confidence that the two sides were close to concluding the agreement, characterizing the ongoing round as potentially the final one required (News on Air, 2026a). As of mid-2026, both governments were targeting an October 2026 conclusion, though negotiations had encountered specific friction points, with Chile seeking expanded market access for sensitive agricultural products including gold, salmon, wine, apples, walnuts, avocados, and other fruits and berries (Business Standard, 2026). Given the current date of this Framework's preparation, the immediate short-term priority is the successful resolution of these remaining sticking points and formal conclusion of CEPA, followed by the legal vetting and ratification processes typically required before such agreements enter into force, a sequencing pattern consistent with comparable Indian CEPA negotiations, including the parallel India-Canada process targeting a similar late-2026 conclusion window (Dainik Jagran English, 2026).

Beyond CEPA conclusion itself, this Framework identifies six further short-term priorities requiring completion within the one-to-five-year window. First, finalization of the specific agreements already identified as under active negotiation during the ninth round of Foreign Office Consultations in November 2025, namely cooperation in customs matters, recognition of the Indian Pharmacopoeia, the Traditional Medicine and Yoga agreement, the Social Security Agreement, space sector cooperation, and the disability sector cooperation agreement referenced in the April 2025 joint statement (News on Air, 2025c; Public Now, 2025). Each of these represents a substantially advanced negotiation requiring primarily political will to close rather than fresh technical groundwork. Second, finalization of the multiple-entry business and professional visa category announced by President Boric during his April 2025 visit and subsequently discussed at the ninth Foreign Office Consultations round, given its direct relevance to accelerating the Labour, Employment and Migration, Tourism, and Industrial and Manufacturing pillars addressed earlier in this Framework (News on Air, 2025c).

Third, operationalization of the critical minerals investment pipeline currently advancing through commercial channels, most visibly Coal India Limited's evaluation of an acquisition or joint venture involving Kuska Minerals, the Chilean subsidiary of Wealth Minerals Limited, which as of August 2026 remained pending due to regulatory delays following Chile's change of government (Traders Union, 2026; Organiser, 2026). Bringing this and comparable transactions to conclusion within the short-term window is essential to demonstrating that the political commitments articulated in the April 2025 joint statement translate into concrete industrial outcomes. Fourth, formal signing of the digital transformation cooperation understanding referenced explicitly in the April 2025 joint statement, unlocking the proposed Joint Working Group on Digital Transformation and Innovation and the associated India-Chile Startup Bridge programme detailed under Pillar 31 of this Framework.

Fifth, establishment of the full slate of Joint Working Groups recommended under the Implementation Framework, with a target of having all priority working groups convened for

their inaugural meeting within twenty-four months of this Framework's adoption. Sixth, conclusion of a dedicated bilateral audiovisual co-production agreement modeled on the India-Colombia treaty structure, given that this was explicitly named as an area of interest in the April 2025 joint statement and represents one of the more procedurally straightforward agreements available for near-term conclusion, drawing directly on a template India has already successfully applied with seventeen other countries (News on Air, 2024).

Medium-Term Priorities (5 to 15 Years)

The medium-term horizon, spanning approximately 2031 to 2041, is oriented around consolidating the institutional and commercial gains achieved during the short-term period into durable, self-sustaining structures that no longer depend primarily on continued high-level political attention to maintain momentum. The centerpiece of this period should be the full implementation and, where warranted, expansion of the CEPA concluded during the short-term horizon, including the negotiation of subsequent protocol amendments to address sectors or provisions that prove, in practice, to require refinement once the agreement has been in force for several years, a pattern consistent with the evolution of India's earlier Preferential Trade Agreement with Chile, which itself was substantially expanded in 2017 roughly a decade after its original 2007 entry into force (India Strategic, 2025).

Within the critical minerals pillar, the medium-term period should see Indian industrial participation in Chile evolve from the primarily upstream investment and raw ore procurement pattern characteristic of the 2025 to 2026 period toward genuine midstream value addition, consistent with the National Critical Mineral Mission's stated objective of increasing investment across the entire critical mineral value chain rather than raw material extraction alone (Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2026). This should include the establishment of joint processing or refining facilities, whether located in Chile to capture in-country value addition consistent with Chilean industrial policy preferences, or in India to feed directly into the country's expanding electric vehicle and battery manufacturing base, with the specific configuration determined by the commercial and regulatory conditions prevailing at the time.

The medium-term period should also see the Infrastructure and Connectivity pillar mature substantially beyond its currently nascent state. This Framework anticipates that Indian expertise in dedicated freight corridor development, drawing on the demonstrated success of India's own Eastern and Western Dedicated Freight Corridors, which had reached 96.4 percent operational completion across 2,741 route kilometers as of December 2025, could be adapted to support Chilean mining logistics corridors connecting extraction sites to Pacific coast export terminals (Construction World, 2026). Similarly, the Digital Public Infrastructure cooperation initiated during the short-term period should mature into full Chilean adoption of relevant India Stack components, extending the pattern already established with the 24 countries that had signed India Stack cooperation agreements by mid-2026, subject to Chile's own digital governance priorities and regulatory requirements (India Brand Equity Foundation, 2026a).

Institutionally, the medium-term period should see the Joint Commission Meeting achieve the more predictable, roughly triennial cadence recommended under this Framework's Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, rather than the approximately four-year interval that separated the first and second meetings held in October 2020 and August 2024 respectively (Embassy of India, Santiago, 2026c). By the end of the medium-term horizon, this Framework anticipates that the full slate of thirty-one pillars should have progressed beyond the foundational, agreement-negotiation stage that characterizes many of them as of 2026, into sustained implementation, with pillars such as sports cooperation and labour mobility, identified earlier in this Framework as comparatively underdeveloped, having advanced to the point of possessing their own dedicated Joint Working Groups with an established multi-year track record of regular meetings and concrete programmatic activity.

The medium-term period should further see meaningful progress on the people-to-people dimensions of the relationship, with the Academic and Educational Cooperation pillar's proposed dedicated ICCR scholarship allocation for Chilean students, and the EdCIL partnership with the Council of Rectors of Chilean Universities referenced in the April 2025 joint statement, together producing a measurable cohort of Chilean alumni of Indian higher education institutions large enough to constitute a genuine professional and cultural bridge network between the two countries, comparable in function, if not yet in scale, to the alumni networks India has cultivated with longer-standing scholarship partners (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 2025).

Long-Term Strategic Goals (15 to 30 Years)

The long-term horizon, spanning approximately 2041 to 2056, extends beyond the specific institutional and commercial milestones addressed in the short and medium-term sections into broader strategic outcomes that this Framework identifies as the ultimate measure of the Cooperative Framework's success. By this horizon, India will have passed its own Viksit Bharat 2047 milestone, and the relationship envisioned in this Framework's Strategic Vision 2050 should be substantially realized, with India-Chile cooperation functioning as a mature, multidimensional strategic partnership rather than a relationship still substantially defined by the foundational agreements being negotiated during the 2025 to 2026 period addressed throughout this Framework.

The foremost long-term strategic goal is the transformation of the currently commodity-concentrated economic relationship into a genuinely diversified partnership in which critical minerals, while remaining significant, no longer constitute the dominant share of bilateral trade and investment as they do as of 2025 and 2026, when Chilean ores, slag, and ash alone accounted for the majority of Chile's exports to India (Trading Economics, 2026b). This diversification should be measured specifically against growth in pharmaceutical trade, services trade under the CEPA's digital services provisions, industrial manufacturing partnerships extending beyond mineral processing, and a mature bilateral tourism relationship supported by the aviation connectivity improvements anticipated under the medium-term Infrastructure and Connectivity priorities.

A second long-term strategic goal concerns the institutionalization of India-Chile cooperation as a model within India's broader Latin American and Global South engagement strategy. Given Chile's role in founding and hosting the first Community of Latin American and Caribbean States Summit in 2013, and its consistent, high-level support for India's United Nations Security Council aspirations, this Framework envisions the India-Chile relationship by the long-term horizon serving as a template that other components of India's Latin American diplomatic architecture, including its broader CELAC engagement, can draw upon, extending the pillar structure and implementation architecture developed in this Framework to other bilateral relationships within the region where appropriate (Manorama Yearbook, 2022).

A third long-term strategic goal concerns sustainability and climate leadership. By 2030, the International Solar Alliance, of which Chile has been a member since November 2023, aims to have facilitated the deployment of 1,000 gigawatts of global solar capacity and mobilized more than one trillion United States dollars in solar investment (Sanskriti IAS, 2026). This Framework envisions that, by the long-term horizon, India-Chile cooperation under the Alliance's Country Partnership Framework mechanism will have made a demonstrable, quantifiable contribution toward these global targets, with Chile's exceptional Atacama Desert solar resource potential substantially developed through Indian technology transfer and investment partnerships initiated during the short and medium-term periods of this Framework.

A fourth and final long-term strategic goal concerns institutional permanence. This Framework envisions that, by the long-term horizon, the thirty-one pillar structure and the accompanying Implementation Framework detailed in this document will have been tested and refined through at least two full five-year structural reviews under the Periodic Review Mechanism, with the framework's institutional architecture, the Joint Commission Meeting, Foreign Office Consultations, and the full network of Joint Working Groups, having demonstrated sufficient resilience to sustain and deepen cooperation across multiple changes in political leadership in both countries, including the transition already navigated with President Kast's March 2026 inauguration, such that the strength of the India-Chile relationship by 2056 rests on durable institutional foundations rather than depending primarily on the personal diplomatic investment of any single set of leaders.

END NOTE

This Cooperative Framework has traced the **India–Chile relationship across thirty-one distinct pillars of cooperation**, an Implementation Framework designed to translate political commitment into institutional practice, and a Roadmap extending from immediate priorities through a thirty-year strategic horizon. Read as a whole, the document reveals a relationship in a genuinely formative and unusually dynamic phase, one whose present shape owes more to developments within the past two years than to the seven decades of formal diplomatic ties that preceded them.

The evidence assembled throughout this Framework points to a clear **inflection point**. For much of their shared diplomatic history, dating to Chile's status as the first South American country to sign a trade arrangement with India in 1956 and formalized through the 2005 Framework Agreement on Economic Cooperation and the 2006 Preferential Trade Agreement, India and Chile maintained a modest, largely trade-focused relationship (Wikipedia contributors, 2025b). The State Visit of President Gabriel Boric Font to India from April 1 to 5, 2025, functioned as the catalytic event around which the great majority of the substantive cooperation documented across this Framework's thirty-one pillars was either initiated or given renewed political direction (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 2025).

Disaster management and cultural exchange agreements, the Antarctica Letter of Intent, the launch of Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations, and explicit ministerial commitments across health, education, digital transformation, and startup cooperation all trace directly to that single visit. This concentration of foundational activity within a narrow window is both the relationship's principal strength and its principal vulnerability as this Framework is prepared: strength, because it demonstrates how quickly substantive cooperation can be generated when sustained high-level attention is applied; vulnerability, because much of the architecture described in this Framework remains, as of 2026, closer to its point of origin than to a period of tested, multi-year institutional maturity.

The pillar-by-pillar analysis has therefore been deliberately unsparing about this unevenness rather than presenting an artificially uniform picture of bilateral depth. **Critical minerals cooperation**, driven by the concrete commercial logic of India's clean energy transition and Chile's position as a leading global supplier of copper and lithium, has advanced with genuine velocity, evidenced by Coal India Limited's active pursuit of Chilean lithium assets and by the scale of trade growth, with Indian imports from Chile rising 72 percent in fiscal year 2025 alone (India Briefing, 2025).

Healthcare, disaster management, and cultural cooperation have each produced concrete, dated instruments within the same short window. By contrast, pillars such as sports cooperation and labour and migration cooperation remain, as this Framework has documented candidly, largely aspirational, resting on institutional capacity that exists domestically within both countries but has not yet been extended into the bilateral space. This unevenness is not a flaw in the Framework's analysis but an accurate reflection of where

genuine political and commercial energy has, and has not, yet been directed. The Implementation Framework and Monitoring and Evaluation architecture proposed in this document exist specifically to ensure that this unevenness narrows over time rather than hardening into a permanent two-tier structure of favored and neglected pillars.

Three structural features of the relationship documented in this Framework merit particular emphasis as this document closes.

The first is complementarity. India's demand for secure and diversified critical mineral supply chains and Chile's need for reliable, long-term partners willing to invest across the full value chain rather than in extraction alone create a form of mutual dependency that is unusually durable among bilateral economic relationships. It rests on geological and industrial fundamentals rather than on more easily reversed policy preferences (Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2026).

The second is institutional resilience under political transition. The relationship's core mechanisms, the Joint Commission Meeting and the Foreign Office Consultations process, continued to function through Chile's March 2026 presidential transition to José Antonio Kast Rist. India's Minister of State for External Affairs attended the inauguration and held substantive bilateral discussions on trade, investment, critical minerals, and green energy within days of the handover (Embassy of India, Santiago, 2026c). This continuity under changed political leadership is an early but meaningful indicator that the relationship's institutional foundations, however young, are not solely dependent on the individuals who happened to be in office in April 2025.

The third is multilateral convergence. Chile's explicit and repeated support for India's Security Council aspirations, articulated most prominently during President Boric's Sapru House Lecture in April 2025, and both countries' shared membership in Global South coordination platforms and climate coalitions including the International Solar Alliance provide a layer of diplomatic alignment above and beyond the bilateral pillars themselves (News on Air, 2025e).

This Framework has been prepared as an **analytical and organizational instrument rather than as a ratified diplomatic text**, and its value should be understood accordingly. It does not speak on behalf of the Government of India or the Government of Chile, nor does it purport to record commitments beyond those independently verifiable in the public statements, joint communiqués, and official records cited throughout. Its purpose is instead to consolidate, into a single coherent architecture, the substantial but previously scattered record of bilateral activity across trade, security, science, culture, and multilateral diplomacy.

The Framework also proposes an implementation structure, drawing where possible on mechanisms the two governments have already established, capable of carrying that activity forward with greater consistency and accountability than episodic high-level visits alone can provide.

The thirty-one pillars, the Implementation Framework, and the Roadmap set out in this document should therefore be read as a **working proposal rather than a finished settlement**. Consistent with the Periodic Review Mechanism detailed earlier in this Framework, the specific content of each pillar, the institutional arrangements proposed to advance it, and the milestones set out in the short-, medium-, and long-term Roadmap should all be expected to evolve as the relationship itself evolves.

This flexibility will be particularly important as the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement moves from negotiation toward implementation and as pillars presently in their earliest stages, including sports, labour mobility, and legal and judicial cooperation, either mature into substantive tracks of their own or are consolidated with adjacent pillars where separate treatment proves administratively unwarranted.

What can be stated with confidence, on the basis of the evidence reviewed throughout this Framework, is that the **India–Chile relationship enters the period covered by this document with more political momentum, more active negotiating tracks, and a more diversified base of engagement than at any prior point in the seven decades since the two countries first established diplomatic and commercial ties.**

Whether that momentum translates into the mature, thirty-one-pillar partnership envisioned under this Framework's Strategic Vision 2050 will depend less on the ambition of the architecture proposed here than on sustained and disciplined institutional follow-through. The working groups, implementation mechanisms, and periodic reviews described throughout this document will need to function consistently across the full breadth of the relationship rather than becoming concentrated only in those pillars that generate the greatest immediate visibility.

The ultimate test of this Framework, therefore, will not be the number of recommendations it contains or the breadth of its architecture, but whether the relationship it describes becomes **more connected, more institutionalised, and more resilient over time**. If the momentum of the present period can be converted into durable mechanisms and measurable outcomes, the India–Chile partnership can move beyond its formative stage and develop into a comprehensive relationship capable of sustaining cooperation across economic, strategic, technological, cultural, and human dimensions well into the decades ahead.

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